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POLICE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 
COMING SOON
“One World, One Voice, One Purpose”
Mark your calendar! The 
British Columbia Association 
of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia, Police Academy are hosting the Police 
Leadership 2008 Conference in Vancouver, location of 
the 2010 Winter Olympics. This is Canada's largest 
police leadership conference held every two years, 
attracting international speakers and participants. 
This police leadership conference will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to hear leadership topics 
discussed by world-renowned speakers. Due to the 
world-class nature of this conference organizers are 
anticipating over 700 delegates from across Canada, 
the U.S., and Europe. 
Leadership in policing is not bound by position or rank 
and this conference will provide delegates from the 
police community an opportunity to engage in a variety 
of leadership areas. The Police Leadership 2008 
Conference will bring together experts who will 
provide current, lively, and interesting topics on 
leadership. The carefully chosen list of keynote 
speakers will also provide a first class opportunity at 
a first class venue to hear some of the world's 
outstanding authorities on leadership, the challenges 
facing the policing community, and how to overcome 
those challenges. 
The conference theme is “The Future of Police 
Leadership” - One World (to recognize globalization 
of law enforcement and crime), One Voice (to 
recognize the convergence of communications and 
technology), One Purpose (to break down some of the 
institutional barriers and recognize law enforcement's 
primary goal of crime reduction and prevention).
Conference speakers include:
 Micheal Abrashoff
 Dr. Linda Duxbury
 Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca
 James Mapes
 San Jose Police Chief Rob Davis
 Nick Kaldas
And don’t miss out on Emmy award 
winning comedian and improvisational 
entertainer Wayne Brady, one of the 
most versatile men in show business, 
who will be the featured 
entertainment during the banquet 
dinner. He sings, dances, acts, and is 
an improvisational genius. He recently 
hosted the Simon Cowell produced “Celebrity Duets” 
on Fox and was seen in guest starring roles on the hit 
shows “Everybody Hates Chris”, “How I Met Your 
Mother”, and the hit NBC show, “30 Rock.” Known for 
hosting his own syndicated talk/variety show “The 
Wayne Brady Show" for two years, Brady picked up 
two Emmys for Outstanding Talk Show Host for his 
ability to do it all and make audiences laugh. The show 
also won an Emmy for Outstanding Talk Show.  Prior to 
“The Wayne Brady Show,” Brady was best known for 
his improvisational skills on ABC’s “Whose Line Is It 
Anyway?” for which he won an Emmy and earned four 
Emmy nominations. Wayne can also be seen as host of 
the new game show “Don’t Forget the Lyrics!” on FOX. 
See pages 27-29 for more registration information 
or check out the website at:
www.policeleadershipconference.com
April 14-16, 2008
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e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“I was introduced to 
your publication by our 
detachment commander. 
Finally, I can actually say that I enjoy 
reading about case law. Some of the folks in our office 
think I'm nuts but obviously they have yet to discover 
your newsletter.” - Police Constable, Ontario
*********
“I find the publication excellent for the 
case law especially !!!”  - RCMP Sergeant, 
Major Crimes, Saskatchewan
*********
“I've become an avid reader of your 
articles/newsletter.  Great info!  I'm glad 
to have access to such a valuable 
information resource.” - Police Officer, Alberta
*********
“Thanks for the great publication. I enjoy 
reading the rulings and your analysis and 
explanations of them. Keep up the great 
work.” - Police Constable, British Columbia
*********
“I love 10-8 and find it invaluable to keep 
up on the latest case law. Thanks.” - RCMP 
Constable, British Columbia
*********
“I have been reading your 10-8 
Newsletter and have really enjoyed the 
content and perspective.” - Police 
Sergeant, Alberta 
*********
“This is an excellent source of information 
and I’d truly appreciate being added to 
the distribution list.  I’m particularly 
grateful that I passed the quiz with flying colours!” - 
Crown Prosecutor, Saskatchewan
*********
“This is a wealth of information for the 
21st century police officer.  In today’s 
policing you need to stay on top of the 
latest case law rulings, and to do that you need to read, 
read, and read some more! With more then 25 years 
now in policing I still learn something new each and 
every day I come to work! “ - Police Constable, Alberta 
www.10-8.ca
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IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge your 
understanding of the law. 
Each question is based on a case featured in this issue. 
See page 43 for the answers.
1. Police photo line-ups not complying with the 
recommendations of the Sophonow Inquiry are ipso 
facto inadmissible as evidence.
 (a) True
 (b) False
2. What was the number one cause of peace officer 
deaths in Canada over the last 10 years?
 (a) Auto accidents
 (b) Aircraft accidents
 (c) Gunfire
 (d) Struck by vehicle
 (e) Heart attack
3. An investigative detention does not necessary need 
to follow immediately on the heels of the commission 
of a crime.  
 (a) True
 (b) False
4. The odour of burned marihuana, by itself, will provide 
reasonable grounds to arrest a person as one found 
committing  a criminal offence (s.495(1)(b) Criminal 
Code).  
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. The charge of resisting a peace officer under 
s.129(a) of the Criminal Code does not require an 
arrest, but rather only resistance to a peace officer 
in the execution of their duties.
 (a) True
 (b) False
6. More than a person’s mere presence at the scene of 
a crime is required to support a conviction for a 
criminal offence.
    (a) True
 (b) False
“In today's policing you need to stay on 
top of the latest case law rulings and  I 
find [the "In Service 10-8" publication] 
to be an outstanding tool for the rulings and your 
analysis and explanations of them.” -  RCMP Constable, 
British Columbia
*********
“I am the Station NCO...and look forward 
to the next issue of the In Service 10-8 
newsletter just so I know the most 
recent case laws when reviewing the reports 
generated by patrol.  Can you add me to your email list 
for the future issues so I don’t have to go looking for 
it anymore?” - Police Sergeant, British Columbia
*********
“A colleague recently e-mailed me the 
Nov/Dec 07 issue of 10-8, and I found it 
quite informative; particularly in the 
realm of case law.  I am requesting your assistance to 
add me to your distribution list for future mailings.” - 
Intelligence Officer Strategic Enforcement and 
Intelligence Unit, Ontario
*********
“I have read the publication for many 
years and find it as a great resource. 
Would it be possible to have a copy mailed. 
... It is difficult to get one here at the 
office as they disappear very quickly.” - Police 
Constable, British Columbia
*********
“I found the information contained in the 
issue forwarded to me (Volume 7, Issue 
6) to be very informative and valuable.  
Police across Canada can all benefit from the timely 
distribution of such materials.” - Police Sergeant, 
Saskatchewan
‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
ENTERS 8th YEAR 
The “In Service: 10-8” newsletter is 
now into its 8th year of publication. 
The inaugural issue was printed in 
2001 and now, several years later, 
continues to go strong. Its readership 
spans coast to coast and includes readers from beyond 
Canada. 
www.108.ca
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ON-DUTY DEATHS DOWN
On-duty peace officer 
deaths in Canada fell by 
two last year. In 2007, 
four peace officers lost 
their lives on the job. This 
is the second year in a row 
with a decline in on-duty 
deaths and represents the fewest on duty deaths 
since 1953 - more than 50 years. 
Motor vehicles, not guns, continue to pose the 
greatest risk to officers over the last 10 years. 
Since 1998, 34 officers have lost their lives in 
circumstances involving vehicles, including 
automobile and motorcycle accidents (22), 
vehicular assault (4), and being struck by a 
vehicle (8). These deaths account for 46% of all 
on-duty deaths, which is more than twice the 
next leading cause of gunfire (15). On average, 
seven officers lost their lives each year during 
the last decade, while 2002 had the most deaths 
at 12. 
2007 Roll of Honour
Constable Daniel Tessier
Laval Police Department, QC
End of Watch: March 2, 2007
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Constable Robert Plunkett
York Regional Police Service, ON
End of Watch: August 2, 2007
Cause of Death: Vehicular Assault
Constable Christopher Worden
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, NWT
End of Watch: October 6, 2007
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Constable Douglas Scott
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, NU
End of Watch: November 5, 2007
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Source: The Officer Down Memorial Page, www.odmp.org
They are our heroes. We shall not forget them.
www.10-8.ca
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U.S. On-Duty Deaths Rise
During 2007, the U.S. lost 180 peace 
officers, up 33 from 2006. The top cause 
of death was gunfire (67) — including 
accidents — followed by automobile 
accidents (47),  vehicular assaults (10), 
and being struck by a 
vehicle (9).  The state of 
Texas lost the most 
officers (22), followed 
by Florida and the U.S. 
Government (16),  New 
York (13), California (10) 
and the states of 
Louisiana and North 
Carolina each with eight. 
The average age of 
deceased officers was 
38 years and the average 
tour of duty was 10 
years and 8 months. 
Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by year)
Cause 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 Total
Aircraft accident 2 2 1 2 1 8
Assault 1 1
Auto accident 1 2 1 3 6 2 1 1 2 19
Drowned 1 1 1 3
Duty related illness 1 1
Fall 1 1
Gunfire 3 3 5 1 1 2 15
Heart attack 1 2 1 1 1 6
Motorcycle accident 1 2 3
Natural disaster 1 1
Stabbed 1 1 2
Struck by vehicle 3 2 2 1 8
Training accident 1 1 2
Vehicular assault 1 1 1 1 4
Total 4 6 11 7 6 12 7 9 6 6 74
2007 U.S. Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths
Cause Total
9/11 related illness 7
Accidental 3
Aircraft accident 3
Animal related 1
Auto accident 47
Boating accident 1
Bomb 5
Drowned 3
Exposure to toxins 1
Fall 2
Gunfire 63
Gunfire (accidental) 4
Heart attack 7
Heat exhaustion 1
Motorcycle accident 5
Struck by vehicle 9
Vehicle pursuit 6
Vehicular assault 10
Weather/Natural disaster 2
Total 180
U.S. On Duty Deaths by Gender
Source: The Officer Down Memorial Page, www.odmp.org
US On-Duty Deaths by Year
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Deaths 147 163 161 147 180
www.10-8.ca6
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GUN WOULD HAVE BEEN FOUND 
ANYWAY DURING PAT DOWN 
R. v. Burke, 
(2006) Docket:C39828 (OntCA)
Two patrol officers saw the accused 
riding an inappropriately sized bicycle 
on the sidewalk and decided to follow 
him to see what he was up to.  They 
observed him speaking with two other individuals 
and they all fled when they saw the police.  The 
accused rode across an intersection against a red 
light and was followed by police into the lobby of an 
apartment complex where they questioned him, 
with an officer quite close on each side of him. As 
part of their questioning, the police asked him if he 
had any outstanding charges. He admitted that he 
was before the court on cocaine charges.  The 
officer then spotted what was confirmed to be a 
cell phone.  When asked if it was a cell phone, the 
accused replied that it was a cell phone, but it 
wasn’t his coat.  The police officers arrested him 
for failing to comply with the terms of his 
recognizance because it was believed that his 
answer was evasive and an attempt to distance 
himself from the cell phone.   It was an officer’s 
experience that a condition of bail in narcotics 
cases prohibits possession of cell phones. A pat 
down search following his arrest revealed a loaded 
.45-calibre handgun, a magazine with bullets, more 
bullets, a small amount of crack cocaine, and a 
“tear-away business card”.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 
the judge found that the questioning by police did 
not constitute an unlawful detention. The 
possession of a cell phone with a possible ban, and 
the accused’s answer to the police officers’ 
questions, provided a reasonable basis for the 
arrest.  Therefore, the search and seizure were 
incidental to arrest and no Charter breaches 
occurred. And even if there was a Charter breach, 
the trial judge would have admitted the gun and 
drug evidence under s.24(2), but exclude the tear 
away business card. The officers were acting in 
good faith in the honest belief that they had 
grounds for arrest and the evidence was 
non-conscriptive. He concluded that its exclusion, 
rather than its inclusion, would bring the 
administration into disrepute.  
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing the trial judge erred by finding he was not 
detained until arrested.  Although he acknowledged 
he was not physically detained, he contended he was 
psychologically detained even though he didn’t 
testify. Objectively, he submitted he was stopped, 
in part, for violating Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act
(HTA) when he rode his bike on the sidewalk and 
crossed the street diagonally on a red light. He said 
he was required under the HTA to answer the initial 
questions about identity, restricted in movement by 
the positioning of the officers, and was never told 
that he was free to leave.  
The “fact an accused does not testify is not 
definitive of whether there has been a detention and 
that the surrounding circumstances must be 
considered.”  In this case, the trial judge chose not 
to draw the inference of detention and the Ontario 
Court of Appeal did not find he erred. The detention 
was not arbitrary. As for whether or not the police 
had reasonable grounds to arrest, the appeal court 
concluded this case was a close one. The accused 
conceded the police subjectively had reasonable 
grounds to arrest so the issue was whether there 
were objective grounds. But in the end it didn’t 
matter. The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled the 
evidence admissible under s.24(2) of the Charter 
even if there were no reasonable grounds to arrest: 
Whether or not the police had grounds to 
lawfully arrest the [accused], we are of the 
opinion that the evidence was admissible 
pursuant to s. 24(2).  The officers acted in good 
faith.  The arrest was not arbitrary.  The gun 
could have been found pursuant to a patdown 
officer safety search pursuant to a lawful 
detention and therefore the fairness of the trial 
was not affected.  The search was minimally 
intrusive and, although some force was used in 
effecting the arrest, it was after the gun was 
discovered and it appears that the amount of 
force involved was inadvertent.  There is no 
evidence that the [accused] was injured.   The 
offences in question are serious. [para. 13]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“Choose a job that you love and you will never have to 
work a day in your life .“- Confucius
www.10-8.ca
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CONFIRMATION OF TIP’s 
CRIMINAL ASPECT NOT 
REQUIRED
R. v. Caissey, 2007 ABCA 380
A police officer received information 
from a first time informant that he/
she had been in a certain apartment 
within the preceding 72 hours and had 
observed a large quantity of marijuana being held by 
the accused for resale. The informant identified the 
accused, the address of the apartment, and also 
indicated that while the accused had a roommate 
(Kelsey Coenen) it was only the accused who was 
involved in selling drugs and that he had done so for 
a period of one year. The informant provided details 
relating to the interior of the apartment and the 
accused’s motor vehicle, and indicated that no 
children lived at the address.
The investigating officer confirmed from 
independent sources that the accused lived with 
Kelsey Coenen at the address provided, and that the 
accused drove a vehicle that matched the 
informant’s description. The officer prepared an 
information to obtain a search warrant in which he 
set out the information he received and disclosed 
the extent and result of his investigation. While the 
officer verified the information provided, the police 
had not corroborated certain details, such as the 
fact that marijuana could be found in the apartment.
The search warrant was issued and executed. In a 
locked bedroom within the residence the police 
located and seized 180 grams of marijuana, drug 
paraphernalia, and documents in the accused’s name. 
He was charged with possession of marijuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused 
challenged the validity of the search warrant. He 
argued, among other grounds, that the information 
provided was insufficient to support the issuance of 
the search warrant. The trial judge ruled the 
information established those details that had been 
confirmed, which provided a sufficient basis to issue 
the search warrant. She concluded that it was 
reasonable to believe that there was marijuana in 
the apartment and the accused was convicted of 
simple possession. 
The accused then appealed his conviction to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal submitting, in part, that the 
trial judge erred in failing to apply the proper legal 
test when determining the validity of the search 
warrant. He contended that confirmation of 
information received from a confidential informant 
must include confirmation of criminal activity. In his 
view, information provided by a first-time informant 
can only constitute sufficient grounds for the 
issuance of a search warrant if there is independent 
confirmation of the allegations relating to the crime. 
Consequently, he argued that the search warrant 
should not have issued because the police failed to 
independently confirm the first-time informant’s 
information that the accused had marijuana in the 
apartment. The accused submitted that some 
independent confirmation relating to the criminal 
aspect of the tip is required in a case where the 
police are relying on a tip from an informant of 
unknown reliability in order to negate the possibility 
that the informant is offering false information.
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
trial judge applied the correct test in reviewing the 
issuance of the search warrant and that the 
jurisprudence did not require confirmation of the 
criminal aspect of the information. Rather, the 
court must take into account the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the search 
warrant could have issued on the evidence. The 
Crown further submitted that the evidence was 
sufficient to meet that test.
In a 2:1 majority, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
upheld the issuance of the search warrant. When 
the validity of a search warrant is challenged, it may 
be necessary to inquire into the source and quality 
of the information provided to the police at the time 
of the search in order to establish that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds for the search. 
Mere conclusory statements by an informant are 
insufficient to constitute reasonable and probable 
belief. Details relating to the confidential 
informant, the information received or the 
background investigation must be provided. 
An informant’s “tip” must contain sufficient detail to 
ensure it is based on more than mere rumour or 
gossip, whether the informer discloses his or her 
source or means of knowledge and whether there 
are any indicia of his or her reliability, such as the 
www.10-8.ca8
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supplying of reliable information in the past or 
confirmation of part of his or her story by police 
surveillance. The reliability of the tip is to be 
assessed by recourse to “the totality of the 
circumstances”. There is no formulaic test as to 
what this entails. Rather, the court must look to a 
variety of factors including the degree of detail of 
the “tip”; the informer’s source of knowledge; and 
indicia of the informer’s reliability such as past 
performance or confirmation from other 
investigative sources. When the police rely on an 
anonymous tip or on an untried informant the quality 
of the information and corroborative evidence may 
have to be such as to compensate for the inability to 
assess the credibility of the source. 
In holding the warrant valid in this case, the 
majority stated:
Reliability of an informant may be 
established by past performance as 
an informant or by confirmation 
from other investigative sources of 
part, or all, of the information 
provided by the informant…. 
The issue on review is whether 
there was some evidence that 
might reasonably be believed to 
support the issuance of the 
warrant, not whether there is some 
guarantee that the informant is 
telling the truth when he makes the 
allegation of criminal activity. 
Information of a crime itself being 
committed does not have to be 
confirmed… 
We agree with the Crown’s submission that the 
trial judge applied the correct test and made no 
error in concluding that the search warrant 
could have been issued on the evidence 
provided. The trial judge considered whether 
the information provided was “sufficiently 
detailed to preclude the possibility that it’s 
based on mere rumour.” Regarding the aspect of 
reliability of the informant, the trial judge 
relied on the evidence confirming some aspects 
of the information provided. In this respect, 
she stated: “We are looking for this 
confirmation because if the tipster is proven 
correct about some details it might be safe to 
rely on other information provided.” The trial 
judge examined the factors set out in Garofoli 
and correctly referred to the standard of 
review. She acknowledged that she could not 
overturn the search warrant simply because she 
might not have granted it. The trial judge 
concluded that the authorizing judge could have 
issued the search warrant based on the record 
before him, as amplified on review, as there was 
some information that might reasonably be 
believed. She based this finding on the 
information that the informant had recently 
been in the [accused’s] apartment and had 
personally witnessed the drugs in the 
[accused’s] possession.
The trial judge committed no error. With 
reference to the three factors set out in 
Debot, the information provided by the 
informant was detailed and compelling, and was 
based on his/her personal knowledge that had 
been recently obtained while in the appellant’s 
apartment. Although the informant had not 
previously provided confidential information to 
the police, he/she was known to 
the police officer, and the police 
independently confirmed a 
number of details, including the 
identity of the [accused] and his 
residential address, that no 
children lived in the home, the 
name of his roommate, and the 
description of his vehicle. 
Confirmation of this information 
tended to substantiate the 
reliability of the informant’s 
information, and was sufficient 
in the context of the other 
factors to meet the reasonable 
probability test. While the 
police did not obtain any confirmation of the 
fact that the [accused] possessed marijuana, 
such confirmation is not necessary in the 
circumstances of this case. The trial judge 
correctly stated and applied the law. [paras. 
22-25]
A Different View
Justice Martin, in dissent, concluded that the 
information provided was insufficient to support the 
search warrant. He said:
Here, the information was sufficiently detailed 
to guard against rumour and innocent 
coincidence. However, the informant’s 
credibility was untested and remained unknown 
at the time the search warrant issued. In terms 
of corroboration, the police investigator was 
only able to corroborate non-criminal 
“The issue on review is whether 
there was some evidence that 
might reasonably be believed to 
support the issuance of the 
warrant, not whether there is 
some guarantee that the 
informant is telling the truth 
when he makes the allegation of 
criminal activity. Information of a 
crime itself being committed 
does not have to be confirmed.”
www.10-8.ca
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particulars, such as the [accused’s] address, 
the identity of his roommate, the make and 
colour of his motor vehicle. This was innocuous 
information available to anyone in the 
neighbourhood and those familiar with the 
[accused] (or his roommate). Confirmation of 
these non-criminal particulars shed no light on 
the reliability of the accusation that the 
appellant was in possession of marijuana or 
selling drugs. It did not, in any material way 
enhance the credibility of this first-time 
informant.
I accept that in assessing the reliability of the 
information provided, the totality of 
circumstances must be examined and short 
comings in one of the three factors may be 
compensated by strengths in another. But here, 
there was no evidence at all to establish the 
third factor, informant’s credibility or 
meaningful corroboration. This is more than a 
mere short coming.
To issue this search warrant, the justice of the 
peace relied exclusively on uncorroborated 
allegations of criminal conduct provided by a 
first-time informant. The information relied on 
to obtain the search warrant did not offer any 
meaningful assurance that the informant was 
credible and therefore the allegations of 
criminal conduct were likely true. In my opinion, 
this was inadequate legal justification to 
authorize the search of a home.
………
In my opinion, when a first-time informant 
whose credibility has not been previously (or 
otherwise) established, evidence of his or her 
credibility is required before allegations of 
criminal conduct are relied upon….
In my opinion, confirmation of non-criminal 
particulars offered by a first-time informer 
does not necessarily alleviate the concern that 
the information about criminal conduct may be 
false. Only corroboration of some criminal 
particular offers that assurance. A malicious 
informant may falsely offer very detailed 
information by claiming it was based on 
personal observation. Therefore, neither a 
detailed account nor corroboration of an 
innocent particular of that account offers the 
needed assurance that the informant is 
credible and the information likely true. [paras. 
31-38]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
POLICE PERSISTENCE IN 
OBTAINING VOLUNTARY DNA 
SAMPLE OK
R. v. Karas, 2007 ABCA 362
The partially naked body of a 58 year 
old female murder victim was found 
strangled and stabbed at least 30 
times. A minute amount of seminal fluid 
was found on her, thus providing a male DNA profile 
for police. With no other evidence other than the 
DNA, police asked various men in the area for 
voluntary samples of their DNA for comparison 
purposes. Fred Karas, the accused’s father, was one 
of the men who gave a blood sample. While none of 
the samples taken provided a match, it appeared 
that a first degree relative either of Fred Karas, or 
of another identified person, may provide a match. 
The police, therefore, sought to obtain samples 
from Fred Karas' sons. 
The 21 year old accused, a son of Fred 
Karas,  attended the police detachment at the 
request of a police officer to provide a voluntary 
sample of his blood. The officer interviewed the 
accused for 38 minutes and established that he 
knew the victim, that at the time of the murder he 
was living in the general area of the victim’s 
residence, and that he had been in the house a 
couple of years before, prior to the victim moving 
into it. The officer asked the accused for a sample 
of blood to compare to the DNA found at the scene 
in order to eliminate him as a potential suspect. The 
accused was reluctant. The officer read the accused 
a consent form that told him he was not required to 
provide a sample, could contact a lawyer, and that 
the blood sample, if given, would be analyzed in 
association with the murder.
The officer persisted in requesting a sample, 
suggesting he would continue to do so until the 
accused consented. The accused said he was going to 
say no to giving a sample, but "if you do absolutely 
need it in the future, I'll, I'll give it then". The 
officer responded that it was going to come to that 
because his superiors wanted him to take a sample 
of the accused’s DNA. The accused then agreed to 
give a sample.  It was subsequently determined that 
his DNA matched the DNA found on the body of the 
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victim. A DNA warrant 
under s.487.05 of the 
Criminal Code was later 
obtained. and he was 
charged with first 
degree murder.
At trial in the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench, 
the accused testified 
that he agreed to give 
the sample because he 
was afraid to raise a 
suspicion by refusing 
and that he did not call a lawyer because he thought 
it would make him a suspect. He also stated he read 
the statement on the consent form, but thought he 
would be arrested if he refused to give a sample 
even though the police never said that to him. The 
trial judge found that while the officer was not 
completely candid in saying that the accused was not 
a suspect, he was clearly told and clearly understood 
that the police officer would not (at the time) obtain 
a blood sample from him without his consent. 
The trial judge held the accused’s alleged belief 
that police would get the sample from him by force, 
if he refused, was not supported by anything said by 
the police. The police made no threat or promise to 
the accused, other than that he would be eliminated 
as a suspect if the DNA did not match. Nor was 
there any quid pro quo made. The accused 
understood what was being said and the 
circumstances of the interview did not suggest 
oppression. Further, the trial judge found that the 
accused was not detained under the Charter; 
therefore, his rights to a lawyer as provided under 
s.10(b) were not violated. The trial judge also found 
that the second blood sample taken pursuant to a 
warrant on the basis of the earlier admissible DNA 
match was lawful.
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the trial 
judge erred in admitting the DNA sample as he had 
not voluntarily given it. He contended that he did not 
validly waive his rights nor consent to the taking of 
his blood. In his view, the trial judge focused on 
whether or not there was an explicit threat and did 
not focus on his statements to the officer. Even 
though there were no threats or promises is the 
classic sense,  he was not 
comfortable with providing a 
sample of his DNA. He 
suggested the officer's 
statement that the police 
would be insistent in their 
requests if he did not provide 
a sample at the time, 
threatening persistent police 
contact and questioning such 
that the authorities would 
become "a pain in the ass" or 
a "thorn in [his] side" was a 
subtle and sophisticated inducement  sufficient to 
overcome his free will. The accused contended he 
was persuaded against his will to give the sample as 
being the only way to relieve the pressure. Those 
statements and circumstances, he argued, made him 
feel he had no choice but to provide the sample. 
Thus, in all the circumstances, there was a quid pro 
quo or at least a reasonable doubt about whether  
providing a blood sample to police was voluntary. He 
also submitted that his waiver of his rights was not 
valid because he was not sufficiently informed 
allowing him to make a meaningful choice. The police 
denied that he was a suspect in the murder 
investigation and this lack of information affected 
his decision as to whether to seek legal advice 
before giving a sample of his DNA.
The Crown conceded that when the interview took 
place, reasonable grounds for a search or seizure did 
not exist, so that his valid consent was a 
prerequisite to obtaining a lawful sample of his blood.
Consent
The Alberta Court of Appeal first reviewed the law 
on consent. “The person making the waiver should be 
aware of his choices, and possess sufficient 
information to make a meaningful choice,” said the 
Court. A person waiving their right to be secure 
against an unreasonable seizure must be possessed 
of the requisite informational foundation for a true 
relinquishment of the right. A right to choose 
requires not only the volition to prefer one option 
over another, but also sufficient available 
information to make the preference meaningful. 
This is equally true whether the individual is 
choosing to forego consultation with counsel or 
LATIN LEGAL LINGO:
“quid pro quo”- something for something; what for 
what; a mutual consideration; that which a party 
receives or is promised in return for something 
promised, given, or done; getting something of 
value in return for giving something of value; 
securing an advantage or receiving a concession in 
return for a similar favour; for example, an express or 
implied promise that, in return for a suspect’s 
confession, the officer would do something such as 
reduce charges or suggest a lighter sentence.
www.10-8.ca
11
Volume 8 Issue 1
January/February 2008
choosing to relinquish to the police something which 
they otherwise have no right to take.
The trial judge rejected the argument that the 
officer was being coercive in advising the accused 
that the police would be persistent in their 
investigation and continuous in their request for a 
sample. At the time of his interview, the accused 
was also advised of his right to consult legal counsel. 
He was aware that he could obtain legal advice about 
any concern that he may have had about future 
police contact and requests for samples. In these 
circumstances, it was not apparent that the promise 
of further requests for his DNA was oppressive. 
And the Court held the trial judge reasonably found 
that the officer did not hold out a reward in return 
for the giving of the sample when he stated:
The only promise made was that if the sample 
did not match the DNA found at the scene, the 
accused would be eliminated as a possible 
suspect. That was the truth. There was no quid 
pro quo. There was nothing held out as a reward 
solely for the giving of a sample. 
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
assertion that his decision was not an informed 
choice because the officer misled him when he was 
told that he was not a suspect at the time the 
request for the sample was made. The Court held:
The trial judge did find … that the officer 
downplayed the focus of the police investigation 
of [the accused], and did not tell him the whole 
truth. The police officer told [the accused] that 
he was not a suspect, and did not tell him that 
they suspected that one of the first generation 
male relatives of his father or another man was 
probably the perpetrator of the crime.
The nub of this issue is whether [the accused] 
possessed sufficient information to understand 
the nature of the investigation and the 
potential consequences of providing the sample. 
The interview transcript shows that [the 
accused] knew the purpose of the request, as 
well as the jeopardy in which it placed him. The 
following exchange occurred:
[Accused] :  Well it, yeah I'll, I'll give.
[Officer]:  Ok, are you sure cause I, I'm, I, 
it has to be by your consent cause like for 
example the next question I read here is 
there is or I should say the point the 
results of this DNA analysis may be used in 
evidence against you in a court of law. Now 
do you understand that?        
[Accused]: Uh huh.
[Officer]: What does that mean to you?
[Accused]:  That means if my DNA is a 
match to what you have there, it can be 
used against me.      
[Officer]: That's correct yeah.
[Accused]: In a murder or whatever.
Notwithstanding his finding that [the accused] 
was not told the full truth as to the reasons 
motivating the police to seek a sample of his 
DNA, the trial judge was satisfied that the 
waiver was valid and the sample voluntarily 
given. He stated...:
On the whole of the evidence, I find that 
nothing said or done by [the officer] went 
beyond permissible police persuasion. The 
manner in which this sample was obtained 
would not shock the community, bearing in 
mind the philosophy behind the obtaining 
of DNA samples, which is that they are 
often the best tool for exonerating the 
innocent and discovering the guilty.
The principles governing the voluntariness of 
confessions are applicable when considering 
whether [the accused] voluntarily gave his blood 
sample. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
emphasized that the analysis under the 
confessions rule "must be a contextual one", and 
that "trial judges must be alert to the entire 
circumstances surrounding a confession" in 
making the decision whether or not to admit it. 
The careful judgment of the trial judge in this 
instance discloses an assessment of 
voluntariness having regard to all relevant 
circumstances. [references omitted, paras. 29-
33]
The Alberta Court of Appeal was not persuaded that 
the trial judge erred in admitting the DNA evidence 
and the accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
Note-able Quote
“A person without a sense of humour is like a wagon 
without springs. It’s jolted by every pebble on the 
road.” - Henry Ward Beecher
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SOPHONOW INQUIRY’s PHOTO 
LINE-UP RECOMMENDATIONS 
NOT BINDING LEGAL DICTATES
R. v. Doyle, 2007 BCCA 587
A police detective investigating a 
robbery decided to organize a photo 
line-up to show the victim. She 
arranged a group of six photographs, 
including one of the accused that was about two 
months old, which had been selected from part of a 
larger group depicting persons somewhat similar in 
appearance to the accused. A different detective, 
however, showed the photographs to the victim. 
This detective instructed the victim by means of a 
written sheet translated into Chinese that any 
person suspected might or might not be in the 
line-up, that she was not obliged to select anyone, 
and that the photographs being shown might or 
might not be current. The victim picked the accused 
in the photo line-up without hesitation, but she was 
not told whether or not he was a suspect. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the trial 
judge admitted the photo line-up evidence despite 
the procedures used by police not complying with 
the recommendations made by the Inquiry into the 
Wrongful Conviction of Thomas Sophonow. The 
judge said this:
The line-up appears to me to be a fair test of 
the recollection of a witness as to the 
appearance of a suspect, in the sense that it 
contains six photographs of persons who are 
very similar in their looks, and without any 
glaring dissimilarities.  That the line-up process 
was not in accordance with the 
recommendations of the 
Sophonow inquiry as has 
been made an issue by [the 
accused’s lawyer] is to my 
mind neither here nor 
there.  With great respect 
to those who think 
otherwise, those 
recommendations are not 
legal prerequisites for 
reliance on a line-up, or on 
line-up evidence by a trier 
of fact.   The line-up here 
was fair, and the process by 
which it was shown to [the victim] discounted 
any chance that her identification might be 
tainted by the investigating officers.
The victim also picked the accused out in court. The 
accused was convicted of robbery based in part on 
the photo line-up identification, but appealed to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing the trial 
judge erred in attaching any weight to the witness' 
identification evidence from the photo line-up 
because it was not administered in accordance with 
the recommendations made by the Sophonow 
Inquiry. This in turn, tainted the in court (docket) 
identification and little, if any, reliance should be 
placed on that identification. 
The accused suggested there were a number of 
flaws with the photo line-up not complying with the 
Sophonow Inquiry recommendations such as:
1) it was not videotaped; 
2) the line-up contained only six photographs and 
not the recommended minimum of 10 photographs;
3) the officer showing the line-up was aware that 
the suspect's photo was in the line-up.
Because of these variations from recommended 
practice, the accused submitted the trial judge 
should have placed no reliance on the identification 
of the accused.  
The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the 
accused’s arguments. Photo line-ups not conducted 
fully in accord with the procedures outlined in the 
Sophonow Inquiry will not be ipso facto excluded as 
evidence. Failure to follow the recommendations will 
not necessarily result in the exclusion of the line-up 
identification and the 
subsequent in-court 
identification. The Sophonow 
recommendations, although 
sound, sensible, and well 
considered, are only 
recommendations but do not 
have the force of law. Justice 
Hall, on behalf of the 
unanimous Appeal Court, wrote:
[T]he recommendations 
arising from the Sophonow 
Inquiry are not to be viewed 
“[T]he recommendations arising from 
the Sophonow Inquiry are not to be 
viewed as binding legal dictates.  The 
admissibility and weight of lineup 
identification evidence will fall to be 
assessed in individual cases having 
regard to all the circumstances.  The 
governing consideration must always 
be whether identification procedures 
have been fairly conducted by 
investigators.”
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as binding legal dictates.  The admissibility and 
weight of lineup identification evidence will fall 
to be assessed in individual cases having regard 
to all the circumstances.  The governing 
consideration must always be whether 
identification procedures have been fairly 
conducted by investigators.
………
I am in respectful agreement with [the] 
comments of the learned trial judge.   In my 
opinion, this lineup was, in its constitution and 
conduct, a satisfactory procedure and I 
consider that there was no unfairness 
occasioned to the [accused] by the police 
procedures utilized in this case.   Of course, 
cases will vary infinitely in their facts and it will 
always be for the trier of fact to assess in the 
individual case the strength or weakness of the 
identification evidence.   Here the judge 
properly instructed herself concerning 
eyewitness identification and found she could 
place reliance on the identification of the 
[accused] made by [the victim].     In the 
circumstances of this case, the judge was 
entitled to give due weight to the identification 
evidence. [paras. 13-15]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
THE SOPHONOW INQUIRY:
Photo pack line-up Recommendations
  
 The photo pack should contain at least 10 
subjects. 
 The photos should resemble as closely as possible 
the eyewitnesses' description. If that is not 
possible, the photos should be as close as possible 
to the suspect. 
 Everything should be recorded on video or 
audiotape from the time that the officer meets 
the witness, before the photographs are shown 
through until the completion of the interview. 
Once again, it is essential that an officer who does 
not know who the suspect is and who is not 
involved in the investigation conducts the photo 
pack line-up. 
 Before the showing of the photo pack, the officer 
conducting the line-up should confirm that he 
does not know who the suspect is or whether his 
photo is contained in the line-up. In addition, 
before showing the photo pack to a witness, the 
officer should advise the witness that it is just as 
important to clear the innocent as it is to identify 
the suspect. The photo pack should be presented 
by the officer to each witness separately. 
 The photo pack must be presented sequentially 
and not as a package. 
 In addition to the videotape, if possible, or, as a 
minimum alternative, the audiotape, there should 
be a form provided for setting out in writing and 
for signature the comments of both the officer 
conducting the line-up and the witness. All 
comments of each witness must be noted and 
recorded verbatim and signed by the witness. 
 Police officers should not speak to eyewitnesses 
after the line-ups regarding their identification or 
their inability to identify anyone. This can only 
cast suspicion on any identification made and 
raise concerns that it was reinforced. 
 The interviews of eyewitnesses and the line-up 
may be conducted by the same force as that 
investigating the crime, provided that the officers 
dealing with the eyewitnesses are not involved in 
the investigation of the crime and do not know 
the suspect or whether his photo forms part of the 
line-up. 
Source:
www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/recommendations/english.html
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
“The criterion for the lawfulness of an arrest 
is the presence of reasonable and probable 
grounds. That standard has alternatively 
been described as “reasonable ground to 
believe”, “reasonable grounds”, “reasonable belief”, 
“probable cause”, and “reasonable probability”.  It has both 
a subjective and an objective component. The police officer 
must subjectively believe that he has reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the arrest; he must also have 
objectively justifiable grounds that “a reasonable person, 
standing in the shoes of the police officer, would have 
believed that reasonable and probable grounds existed to 
make the arrest”. .... Moreover, it is the cumulative effect of 
the evidence or the totality of the circumstances that must 
be weighed in determining if the standard of reasonable and 
probable grounds has been met.” - British Columbia 
Supreme Court Justice Smith, R.  v. Tetreault, 2007 BCSC 
1624, para. 28-29, references omitted.
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FORMER SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE DIES
The Honourable Gerald 
Eric Le Dain, formerly a 
justice of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, passed 
away on December 18, 
2007. Justice Le Dain was 
born in 1924 in Montreal. 
He served overseas with 
the armed forces during 
the Second World War. 
After returning to Canada 
in 1946, he enrolled at 
McGill University, obtained 
a B.C.L. degree in 1949, and was awarded the 
Elizabeth Torrance Gold Medal. That year, he 
pursued his studies in France, at the University of 
Lyon, and became a Docteur de l'Université in 1950. 
He first practised law with Walker, Martineau, 
Chauvin, Walker & Allison in Montreal. 
From 1953 to 1959, and in 1966 and 1967, he taught 
law at McGill University. He became dean of 
Osgoode Hall Law School in 1967 and was called to 
the bar of Ontario the following year. From 1969 to 
1973, he chaired the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Non-Medical Use of Drugs. Two years later, he was 
appointed to the Federal Court of Appeal and the 
Court Martial Appeal Court. He was elevated to the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1984. Justice Le Dain 
served on the Supreme Court for four years, 
retiring in 1988. He was made a Companion of the 
Order of Canada in 1989.
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, on behalf of the 
members of the Supreme Court of Canada, lamented 
Justice Le Dain's passing. "Justice Le Dain served 
on the Court during an important time in its history, 
taking part in the challenge of breathing life into 
the rights guaranteed in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. Justice Le Dain's decisions in 
these early Charter cases shaped the interpretation 
of our fundamental rights, and continue to have 
relevance to this day."
Note-able Quote
“It’s choice - not chance - that determines your 
destiny.” - Jean Nidetch
POLICE MISCONDUCT REDUCES 
SENTENCE
R. v. Nasogaluak, 2007 ABCA 339
Police received information from a taxi 
company that an intoxicated male was 
driving a black truck. Police attempted 
to stop the truck but a high speed 
pursuit ensued. On two occasions officers had to 
reverse to avoid being hit when the accused drove 
at them. After the accused eventually stopped his 
vehicle, he resisted arrest and would not comply 
with police commands. During the ensuing struggle, 
the accused was struck by police, which resulted in 
broken ribs and a collapsed lung. The police did not 
record the force used in subduing the accused and 
they failed to document his injuries, nor was the 
arrest or subsequent detention recorded on video. 
The accused received emergency surgery the 
following day to treat his injuries. 
In the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the accused 
pled guilty to impaired driving and evading a police 
officer. At his sentencing hearing, the judge 
concluded the police used excessive force in 
arresting the accused, thereby breaching his s.7 
(security of the person) and s.11(d) (presumption of 
innocence) rights under the Charter. Although the 
sentencing judge noted that the accused’s flight 
from police, the pursuit, and danger to the police 
would usually require a prison sentence, he imposed 
a reduced sentence as a remedy under s.24(1) of the 
Charter. A 12 month conditional discharge on each 
of the two counts was given. 
The Crown appealed the lesser sentence to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal arguing, among other 
grounds, that the sentencing judge erred in reducing 
the sentence as a remedy under s.24(1). When an 
individual’s rights under the Charter have been 
violated, the court has the discretion to grant a 
remedy it considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances. In doing so, a judge may exercise 
this discretion based on their careful perception of 
the nature of the right and the infringement, the 
facts of the case, and the application of relevant 
legal principles. 
Justice McFadyen, writing the decision of the 
Alberta Court of Appeal, concluded that a sentence 
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reduction below what would normally be imposed is a 
remedy that is available under s.24(1):
[A] reduction in sentence may be granted as a 
remedy for a Charter breach where the breach 
mitigates the seriousness of the offence, or 
imposes some form of punishment on the 
individual that should be factored in calculating 
the sentence. Generally, reductions in the 
sentence imposed should not be used as a 
means of punishing or sending a message to the 
police. While we find that a reduction in 
sentence is an available remedy under s. 24(1) 
in some circumstances, it is a remedy to be 
used sparingly and as a last resort in 
extraordinary cases. This interpretation 
respects the provisions of the Criminal Code 
which set out the objectives and principles of 
sentencing. [para. 38]
In this case, there was a connection between the 
Charter breaches and the remedy sought. As well, 
the accused suffered a hardship as a result. The 
excessive force was found by the sentencing judge 
to have caused the rib fractures and lung collapse, 
which required surgery. The sentencing judge also 
concluded the failure to disclose the force used may 
have led to the failure to provide medical treatment 
promptly. Justice McFayden held the sentencing 
judge did not err in reducing the sentence under 
s.24(1).
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
FRESH PURSUIT ANALYSIS 
INCLUDES TRAVEL TIME FOR 
POLICE TO RESPOND
R. v. Puyenbroek, 2007 ONCA 824
After the intoxicated accused left a 
Christmas party he hit two pedestrians 
walking on the shoulder of the highway. 
Police were called and it took the 
responding officer, 55 kilometers away, almost 50 
minutes to arrive on scene. After spending 20-25 
minutes investigating the scene, the officer went to 
the accused’s house about half a kilometer away 
because of information he obtained at the accident 
scene. He saw fresh tracks in the snow leading to a 
Ford F150 pick-up truck and footprints from the 
truck to the house. The front of the truck was 
damaged as well as the side view mirror, consistent 
with evidence found at the scene. 
The accused’s wife came out of the house and asked 
the officer what he was doing there. The officer 
asked who had been driving the truck and she said 
her husband had just arrived home. Another officer 
attended and police knocked on the front door. The 
accused’s wife returned to the door and when asked, 
told police that her husband was in bed. The officer 
said he would like to speak to her husband and the 
accused’s wife backed off from the front door and 
gestured that he was in the bedroom. The officer 
assumed this was an invitation to enter the house 
and to follow her to the bedroom, which the officers 
did.
In the bedroom police found the accused either 
sleeping or pretending to sleep. He had very red, 
watery eyes, a strong odour of alcohol on his breath 
and a slight slurring of his speech. The officers 
asked him to dress, placed him under arrest and 
handcuffed him. He was taken to the police car and 
read his rights. The officers also took possession of 
a rifle, a 12-gauge shotgun, and ammunition, which 
they found improperly secured in the bedroom.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused was convicted of impaired driving causing 
bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, 
failing to remain at the scene of the accident, and 
careless storage of firearms.  The trial judge used 
the hot pursuit doctrine as one justification for the 
police officers’ entry onto the accused’s property 
and into his home and bedroom. He acknowledged 
that the hot pursuit exception requires a close 
temporal connection between the accident and 
police entry, but stated that the time focus should 
begin at the point when the police first arrived on 
the accident scene. He concluded that in this case, 
“the investigation and pursuit was continuous, 
diligent, and led in a short period of time, about one 
half hour or slightly more, to arrest.” He also found 
that before they entered the house, the police had 
reasonable and probable grounds, both subjectively 
and objectively, to arrest the accused for the 
offence of leaving the scene of an accident. 
The trial judge also found the police had fully 
informed consent to enter the house from the 
accused’s wife. By gesture, she invited them in and 
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led them to the room where her husband was 
resting. She knew her husband had hit something on 
his way home and the officer showed her the 
damage to the truck before they entered the house. 
She appreciated the facts and the implications when 
she allowed the officers in. Further at no time did 
she tell police to leave or stay outside.
 
The accused was sentenced to three years for the 
dangerous driving charges including a credit of 110 
days for pre-trial custody, six months consecutive 
for leaving the scene of an accident, and sixty days 
consecutive for the careless storage of firearms. 
He was also prohibited from driving for five years, 
from possessing a firearm for ten years, and 
ordered to provide a DNA sample.
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
concluding that the police were lawfully in the 
accused’s house through the doctrine of fresh 
pursuit, or in the alternative, by consent. In his view, 
the evidence of the firearms the police found when 
they entered the accused’s bedroom should have 
been excluded because the police breached his s.8 
Charter rights. 
Hot Pursuit
The accused submitted that the circumstances of 
this case did not amount to hot pursuit—neither a 
continuous pursuit nor a single transaction. He also 
argued that the police entered to further their 
investigation and did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds for arrest before they entered 
the house. Further, the officer never said he was in 
hot pursuit, there were exigent circumstances, or he 
had any safety concerns.  Rather, he testified he 
wanted to enter the home to speak with the accused 
and not that he already had reasonable grounds to 
arrest him. Once the officer spoke to his wife, the 
accused contended the police needed a Feeney 
warrant under s.529 or s. 529.1 of the Criminal Code
to enter the home and conduct a search. 
In R. v. Feeney “the Supreme Court of Canada set 
out the general rule that under the Charter, a 
warrant is required both for arrest in a dwelling 
house and to legally search a dwelling house, in order 
to prevent unreasonable intrusions on an individual’s 
right to privacy in the home. However, the court 
confirmed the common law exception where the 
police were engaged in ‘hot pursuit.’ In such cases, 
‘the privacy interest must give way to the interest 
of society in ensuring adequate police protection’” 
Hot or fresh pursuit has been defined as “continuous 
pursuit conducted with reasonable diligence, so that 
pursuit and capture along with the commission of the 
offence may be considered as forming part of a 
single transaction.”
Justifications offered for the hot pursuit exception 
to the sanctity of a private home include:
1) where an offender is a fugitive who has gone 
home while fleeing for the sole purpose of 
escaping arrest, when the police come, they are 
not unexpected or intruding on the person’s 
“domestic tranquility”; 
2) from a practical point of view, offenders should 
not be encouraged to run or drive for home to 
seek refuge from the police, creating dangerous 
situations for members of the public; 
3) the police officer may have personal knowledge 
of the commission of an offence justifying 
arrest, thereby greatly reducing the risk of 
error; 
4) flight usually indicates awareness of guilt; 
5) in some circumstances it may be difficult to 
identify the offender without arresting them on 
the spot; 
6) evidence of the offence may be lost, such as 
evidence of impairment; and 
7) the offender may again flee or continue the 
offence while the police are waiting for them to 
emerge.
The power to enter private premises without a 
warrant to make an arrest is only available, however, 
where the police already have the power and grounds 
to arrest without a warrant. In this case the officer 
did not observe the offence himself. Rather, he 
came from a distance in order to reach the accident 
scene, and he took some time at the scene before 
heading to the accused’s home. The time between 
the accident and the arrest was about one-and-a-
half hours, including the time it took the officer to 
travel to the accident scene, which was some 55 
kilometres away. The trial judge excluded the travel 
time from his consideration of the total 
circumstances in order to reach the conclusion that 
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the commission of the offence, the pursuit, and the 
accused’s capture formed a single transaction, and 
therefore fit within the definition of “hot pursuit.” 
As Justice Feldman, authoring the unanimous 
Ontario Court of Appeal decision, noted:
In so doing, the trial judge effectively 
extended the hot pursuit exception to a 
situation where the officer arrived at the 
scene long after the offence was completed and 
the perpetrator had left; the officer 
conducted an investigation at the scene; he 
developed a “suspicion” that the perpetrator of 
the offence was the [accused] and for that 
reason went to the [accused’s] home; there he 
conducted a further investigation by observing 
the truck and speaking with the [accused’s] 
wife from whom he learned that the [accused] 
was inside the house and had been driving the 
truck; he entered the home to speak to the 
[accused], and after observing evidence of 
inebriation, he arrested the [accused] for 
impaired driving causing bodily harm.
In other words, the trial judge extended the 
hot pursuit exception to a situation where the 
officer had no personal knowledge of the facts 
of the offence or the identity of the 
perpetrator because he neither observed the 
offence nor began or took up any pursuit of 
that perpetrator. He also extended the 
exception to a situation where the time that 
had lapsed between the commission of the 
offence and the arrest was one-and-a-half 
hours. I recognize that part of this time was 
the necessary travel time by the police officer 
in a northern community. However, the effect 
in this case was that the officer neither had 
any personal information about the offence or 
the offender, nor did he begin or take up a 
chase or pursuit in the classical sense because 
the [accused] was already at home by the time 
the officer arrived on the scene. [paras. 28-29]
Extending the hot pursuit exception as done by the 
trial judge needed to be examined in light of the 
amendments to the Criminal Code that now 
specifically provide for a warrant to arrest inside a 
dwelling house and set out the circumstances when 
an officer may enter a dwelling house without a 
warrant. Although the opening words of s.593.3 of 
the Criminal Code appear to leave open the common 
law hot pursuit exception to the rule requiring a 
warrant before an officer can enter a dwelling 
house, the section only expressly provides a peace 
officer with the authority to enter a dwelling house 
without a warrant in situations where there exist 
exigent circumstances. 
The law provides but a very narrow range of 
circumstances when an officer may enter a dwelling 
house without a warrant. Hot pursuit is a necessarily 
narrow exception. “Normally, once an officer has 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest a person 
in a dwelling place, the officer can proceed to obtain 
a warrant, including a telewarrant if necessary, 
before entering the home,” said Justice Feldman. 
“However, if there are exigent circumstances, the 
officer may proceed without a warrant. If there are 
no exigent circumstances, it is difficult to imagine 
why an officer could not proceed to obtain the 
warrant, outside of a “classic” situation of hot 
pursuit, in which the officer is literally at the heels 
of a suspect at the moment the suspect enters a 
dwelling-house.”
In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal said “there 
appeared to be no justifiable reason [the 
investigating officer] could not have obtained a 
warrant to arrest the [accused] if he had reasonable 
grounds to believe the [accused] had committed an 
indictable offence.” The trial judge found that the 
officers had “reasonable and probable grounds 
subjectively and objectively to arrest the accused 
for failing to remain at the scene of the accident 
and were justified in entering the house and 
effecting the arrest, when his condition was noted 
for impairment causing bodily harm.” 
Although there were objective grounds to arrest 
the accused for leaving the scene of an accident, 
there was nothing in the evidence of the officers 
that suggests that they intended to enter the house 
to arrest the accused for that offence. The 
evidence was that the investigating officer intended 
to enter the home in order to speak with the 
accused. Furthermore, once the officers observed 
the accused’s apparent impairment, they arrested 
him for impaired driving causing bodily harm. It was 
unclear whether they arrested him for leaving the 
scene at that time. It may be that the reason the 
officers did not try to obtain a warrant was because 
they were not yet satisfied that they had the 
grounds to arrest him until they spoke to him. 
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Justice Feldman concluded the trial judge erred in 
his finding that the officers subjectively believed 
that they had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused and in finding they were entitled to enter 
the dwelling-house without a warrant on the basis of 
hot pursuit.
Consent
In order for the accused’s wife’s consent to have 
been valid, it must have been fully informed. This 
includes the condition that the person giving the 
consent be aware of their right to refuse. Justice 
Feldman held there was no evidence or suggestion 
that the accused’s wife was informed of her right to 
refuse consent and no finding by the trial judge on 
that aspect of the issue. The trial judge’s conclusion 
on this issue therefore could not stand. 
Exclusion of Evidence
The accused sought to exclude the evidence of two 
long guns, improperly secured and left near loose 
ammunition the police found when they entered his  
bedroom in breach of s. 8 of the Charter. Although 
the evidence was real evidence and therefore no 
trial fairness issue arose, the evidence was 
nonetheless excluded by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. The Court ruled:
In this case, the impugned evidence is two long 
guns and ammunition, which were neither 
illegally owned, nor being brandished. Although 
any firearms offence is serious, the relative 
seriousness of the careless storage offence in 
this case does not outweigh the need to 
exclude the evidence so that the 
administration of justice in promoting the 
sanctity of the home will not be brought into 
disrepute. This court has emphasized that trial 
courts must give appropriate weight to the 
seriousness of the Charter breach at issue 
when considering the effect on the 
administration of justice under s. 24(2) of 
admitting or excluding evidence...As with s. 
24(2) cases involving illegal arrests and 
searches of defendants found in possession of 
relatively small quantities of illegal narcotics or 
monies obtained from crime, in the present 
case, the relative magnitude of the careless 
storage of firearms offence is outweighed by 
the harm to individual liberty and to the 
administration of justice that would result 
from admitting the evidence obtained from a 
warrantless search of a dwelling house...I would 
therefore exclude the evidence of the rifle, 
shotgun, and ammunition. [references omitted, 
para. 42]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LOCATION OF ARREST 
IMPORTANT IN HOT PURSUIT 
ARGUMENT
R. v. Hope, 2007 NSCA 103
The accused, a police officer, 
responded with another officer to a 
complaint that Suzanne Silver had 
uttered a death threat against another 
woman. Police interviewed the victim, and knew 
Silver had been involved with drug and weapons 
offences and had pending charges for assaulting a 
police officer and breach of probation. The two 
officer’s, along with two other backup officers, 
attended Silver’s residence and went to the 
doorstep. The accused officer knocked on the door 
and Silver opened it and stated, “What the f—k do 
you want?” Her hand was on the doorjamb. The 
accused officer explained why police were there but 
Silver said she didn’t know the “f—king” victim. The 
officer felt he needed to arrest Silver to prevent 
the further commission of an offence by her and 
that verbal efforts were unlikely to produce 
compliance. He twice told Silver she was under 
arrest and touched her sleeve. She retreated into 
her residence and the officer followed, restraining 
and handcuffing the physically non-compliant Silver 
with the help of another officer. Silver was taken to 
the police station for booking. She physically 
resisted, assaulted another officer and had to be 
tasered.
The Crown charged both officers involved in Silver’s 
arrest with common assault under the Criminal Code
for apprehending her in her home and assault with a 
weapon for the taser incident at the police station. 
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court the accused 
officers were acquitted. The trial judge concluded 
Silver’s arrest was lawful. The officer determined 
Silver needed to be arrested and placed his hand on 
her sleeve after pronouncing words of arrest. 
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The Crown appealed the acquittals to the Nova 
Scotia Supreme Court. The Supreme Court justice 
allowed the appeal on the accused’s acquittal for the 
assault at Silver’s home. The appeal judge found the 
accused had reached through the open door and 
placed his hands on Silver’s sleeve. He found the 
officer was outside the home and Silver was inside 
the home when the arrest was made. In referencing 
Feeney, the appeal judge noted that the officer 
neither had consent to enter nor a warrant. Since 
the arresting touch occurred while Silver was inside 
her home, the hot pursuit doctrine did not apply. 
Nor where there exigent circumstances. 
The accused officer then appealed to the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal. In a unanimous decision 
written by Justice Fichaud, the Court of Appeal 
reinstated the accused’s acquittal. 
In Feeney, the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
a police officer, absent consent or a warrant, may 
enter a private residence to arrest a person if they 
are in hot pursuit and perhaps, in exigent 
circumstances. Further, implied licence allows the 
police to go to a dwelling’s door to communicate with 
its occupant. In this case, however, there was no 
implied consent allowing the accused officer to 
cross the threshold of Silver’s residence, nor did he 
have a warrant. The hot pursuit doctrine, however, 
did apply. Justice Fichaud stated:
The Crown acknowledged in the proceedings 
below and again at the hearing in the Court of 
Appeal that, if [the accused] lawfully arrested 
Ms. Silver without entering the home, then her 
subsequent apprehension was lawful. Ms. 
Silver's retreat would be an escape from lawful 
custody, contrary to s. 145(1)(a) of the Code, 
and [the accused] could lawfully follow her into 
the home in hot pursuit. I would add that, under 
R. v. Macooh…a hot pursuit must be a fresh and 
continuous pursuit such that the offence, 
pursuit and capture are a single transaction. Ms. 
Silver's alleged threat…had occurred some time 
before the events at the Silver residence. It 
cannot be said that the officers were in hot 
pursuit of Ms. Silver for that offence.
To accomplish a lawful arrest, it is necessary 
that the officer have the subjective belief and 
objective grounds for an arrest, that he 
informs the individual of the arrest and that 
either he touches the individual or, if there is 
no touch, the individual submits to the 
constraint of arrest. 
 
In Feeney, none of these conditions existed 
before the officers entered the trailer. In the 
present case, the trial judge found that, before 
reaching the Silver residence, the officers had 
the subjective belief and objective grounds for 
arrest, based on the information about the 
threat…and Ms. Silver's background. At the 
doorstep, without entering, [the accused] twice 
informed Ms. Silver that she was under arrest. 
Ms. Silver did not submit to an arrest.
[The accused] did not step into the residence 
before touching Ms. Silver. So the lawfulness of 
the arrest, and the outcome of the charge, 
turned on the esoteric point whether or not 
[the accused’s] hand crossed the plane of the 
threshold before he touched Ms. Silver. That 
was an issue of fact. It was not an issue of law 
that was under appeal to the SCAC.
If the trial judge had found that [the accused] 
reached into the residence to touch Ms. Silver, 
then a ruling that [the accused] was in "hot 
pursuit" would be an error of law. There would 
be no lawful custody from which Ms. Silver had 
escaped.
But the trial judge did not find that [the 
accused’s] hand had crossed the plane of the 
doorway. Rather, the trial judge [found] that 
[the accused] touched Ms. Silver's sleeve while 
her hand was on the doorjamb. There was no 
finding that his hand entered the Silver 
residence. [paras. 30-35]
And further:
The trial judge ruled that the doorstep arrest 
was lawful. The [appeal court judge] identified 
no error in the trial judge's definition or 
application of the law on the issues that were 
appealed to the [appeal court]. In my respectful 
view, the [the appeal court judge] erred in law 
by overturning that ruling. The Crown 
acknowledges that, if the doorstep arrest was 
lawful, [the accused] was entitled to enter the 
Silver residence in hot pursuit to apprehend Ms. 
Silver as an individual escaping lawful custody. 
So the apprehension in the home was lawful. 
[The accused’s] defence under s. 25(1)(b) 
acquits him of common assault. [para. 41]
Complete case available at www.courts.ns.ca
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DNR WARRANT PROVISION 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESPITE 
LOWER ISSUANCE STANDARD
R. v. Cody, 2007 QCCA 1276
The accused was tried by a judge and 
jury in Quebec Superior Court on a 
charge of importing cocaine. Some of 
the evidence against the accused 
included information obtained from 17 digital 
number recorder (DNR) warrants that were issued 
during the investigation. At trial the accused argued 
that the DNR provisions of the Criminal Code
authorize search and seizure on reasonable suspicion 
only, thereby failing to meet the minimum 
constitutional requirement of reasonable grounds. 
The search and seizure pursuant to the DNR 
warrants therefore breached s.8 of the Charter and 
could not be saved by s.1. The trial judge dismissed 
the accused’s challenge, found the DNR warrants did 
not offend s.8, allowed the evidence, and the 
accused was convicted.
The accused then appealed to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred by 
holding s.492.2 of the Criminal Code did not violate 
s.8 of the Charter. 
Section 492.2 allows the police to obtain a DNR 
warrant on the basis of “reasonable grounds to 
suspect” rather than the more stringent standard of 
“reasonable grounds to believe”. A DNR works as 
follows:
A digital number recorder (DNR) is activated 
when the subscriber's telephone is taken "off 
the hook". Electronic impulses emitted from 
the monitored telephone are recorded on a 
computer printout tape which discloses the 
telephone number dialled when an outgoing call 
is placed. The DNR does not record whether 
the receiving telephone was answered nor the 
fact or substance of the conversation, if any, 
which then ensues. When an incoming call is 
made to the monitored telephone, the DNR 
records only that the monitored telephone is 
"off the hook" when answered and the length 
of time during which the monitored telephone 
is in that position.
The Crown conceded that there was an expectation 
of privacy with respect to the information obtained 
from a DNR warrant, but that the expectation was 
a reduced one, since the only information resulting 
from these warrants was the duration of a call, the 
number, the date and the time, unlike private 
communications such as wiretaps, in which actual 
conversations are captured and recorded. The 
Crown contended that a reduced standard of 
reasonable suspicion to obtain judicial authorization 
for a DNR warrant was therefore compatible with 
the reduced expectation of privacy.
Justice Hilton, writing the opinion of the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, ruled that reasonable suspicion was 
an appropriate basis for issuing a DNR warrant.  In 
R. v. Wise the majority of the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the unauthorized installation of an 
electronic tracking device on a car constituted an 
unreasonable search that was inconsistent with 
section 8 of the Charter, as did the subsequent 
monitoring of the vehicle, since it invaded a domain 
where one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Nevertheless, the Court found that the intrusion 
was minimal since there was a reduced expectation 
of privacy within a car, and that the unsophisticated 
nature of the device used, as well as its inaccuracy, 
amounted to nothing more than a rudimentary 
extension of physical surveillance. In suggesting 
that legislative measures were in order, the 
majority noted that the tracking device was a less 
intrusive means of surveillance than electronic audio 
or video surveillance and a lower standard such as a 
"solid ground" for suspicion would be a basis for 
obtaining an authorization from an independent 
authority, like a justice, to install a device and 
monitor the movements of a vehicle.
Parliament then responded and introduced s.492.1 
which contemplated the issuance of tracking 
warrants based on the standard of "reasonable 
grounds to suspect". It was at this time that 
Parliament also adopted s.492.2 (DNR provisions). 
Justice Hilton found it difficult to conclude that 
Parliament acted unconstitutionally when the 
legislation was adopted, at least in part, in response 
to a clear direction from the Supreme Court of 
Canada.
Citing various cases, the Quebec Court of Appeal 
recognized that the criterion for issuing warrants, 
such as reasonable grounds to believe,  can vary with 
the context and the level of privacy expectation in 
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the circumstances. There is not only one 
interpretation that will satisfy s. 8 Charter 
concerns. Rather than imposing an inflexible 
standard, the reasonableness standard under s.8 
fluctuates with context. Section 8 does not require 
that each and every search and seizure be done only 
on the basis of the existence of reasonable grounds. 
Thus, the reasonableness of a search and the 
surrounding standards of belief must be assessed in 
the context of each case. Since individuals have 
different expectations of privacy in different 
contexts and with regard to different kinds of 
information and documents, it follows that the 
standard of review of what is "reasonable" in a given 
context must be flexible if it is to be realistic and 
meaningful.
In upholding the constitutionality of the DNR 
provision, Justice Hilton stated:
The very fact that judicial authorization is 
required to obtain a DNR warrant, however, 
means that section 8 of the Canadian Charter 
is engaged. Nevertheless, the context in which 
such warrants are sought does not necessarily 
require that there be "reasonable and probable 
grounds" for their issuance. It is an 
exaggeration to assimilate the information of a 
telephone number and the duration that a 
telephone is off the hook with anything that 
can reasonably be considered so "private" so as 
to require the highest standard of protection 
of section 8 of the Canadian Charter, especially 
when the information does not indicate which 
person is using the telephone, whether there 
was a conversation, and if so, with whom the 
conversation is taking place, as well as its 
details….
I also agree with the trial judge that the 
indication of a target telephone being used to 
call another number, or the duration of an 
incoming call, is more akin to information that 
could be obtained by physical surveillance, such 
as if a targeted person was seen driving a car 
to a specific address and entering the 
premises, or whether someone came and 
entered the premises occupied by someone 
under surveillance, although such physical 
surveillance does not require prior judicial 
authorization. When considered in the context 
of the potential utility of the information that 
can be obtained by DNR warrants, and the 
immediacy with which the information can 
advance criminal investigations, or rule out 
someone as a suspect, I have no hesitation in 
concluding that [the accused’s] constitutional 
challenge fails. [paras. 25-26]
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: The Quebec Court of Appeal chose 
not to adopt the conclusion of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court in R. v. Nguyen, 2004 BCSC 77 
holding that the DNR warrant provisions under the
Criminal Code issued on the basis of reasonable 
suspicion violate s.8 of the Charter. 
GUITAR CASE SEARCH PRIOR TO 
TRANSPORT JUSTIFIED
R. v. Narayan, 2007 BCCA 429
Two police officers responded to a 911 
telephone call from the accused at 
about 3 am. He was outside a residence 
and had two guitar cases with him.  He 
said he needed police assistance to obtain his 
crutches and some keys from inside the residence 
where he had just had an altercation with his 
girlfriend. Police had been called to the same 
residence on prior occasions to deal with disputes 
between the same two people.  The police offered to 
drive the accused to his mother’s residence so he 
got into and sat in the backseat of one of the police 
vehicles.  One of his guitar cases was placed in the 
front seat and the second guitar case was placed in 
the trunk.
While one officer remained at the police car, the 
second officer went back into the residence to have 
a further conversation with the accused’s upset and 
drunk girlfriend.   She told the officer that there 
was a loaded handgun in one of his guitar cases.  The 
two officers met outside the residence and 
searched the guitar case in the trunk of the police 
car.  They found a loaded semi-automatic handgun 
and seized it.  The accused was not arrested or 
otherwise detained and he was driven to his 
mother’s home as police had originally intended to do.
During a voire dire in British Columbia Supreme 
Court, the trial judge found the accused did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation 
to his guitar cases; especially the one placed in the 
trunk where possession and control  had been turned 
over to the police. Further, even if he did have a 
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privacy interest, the search of the guitar case was 
reasonable; the officers were empowered to make 
the search at common law for officer safety. As 
well, he found the search was justified under 
s.117.02 of the Criminal Code (warrantless weapons 
search). And finally, even if the trial judge was 
wrong about the reasonableness of the search, he 
would have admitted the evidence under s.24(2) in 
any event. The accused was convicted of four 
charges related to possession of the unregistered, 
loaded handgun. 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing the warrantless search and 
seizure breached his s.8 Charter rights. Chief 
Justice Finch, delivering the reasons for the Appeal 
Court, found the search was justified under 
s.117.02(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. This section 
allows a peace officer to search a person, vehicle, 
place or premises (other than a dwelling house), 
without a warrant, when they believe on reasonable 
grounds that an offence has been committed 
involving a firearm (or other listed weapon) and that 
conditions exist for getting a warrant, but by reason 
of exigent circumstances it would not be practicable 
to obtain one. Chief Justice Finch ruled that there 
were not only grounds to obtain a warrant, but also 
exigent circumstances. He said this:
Here, the officers were involved in a 
spontaneous investigation in the early morning 
hours in a residential area.  They were 
confronted with an immediate need to remove 
the danger posed by the likelihood a loaded 
handgun was in one of the guitar cases.  There 
was no need for further investigation before 
they acted to alleviate their concerns for the 
need to protect their own safety.
Since the search was authorized under s.117.02, the 
accused’s Charter rights under s.8 were not 
violated, and there was no need to consider s.24(2). 
The accused’s appeal was therefore dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“An apology is a good way to have the last word.” - 
Author unknown
TEST FOR WARRANT REQUIRES 
RELIABLE EVIDENCE
R. v. Manders, 2007 ONCA 849
A provincial constable responded to an 
emergency call to an accident scene.  
At the accident scene the officer 
noticed that the accused had injuries 
to his lower body and was belligerent with 
emergency workers.  After a brief preliminary 
investigation, the officer drove to the hospital 
where he saw emergency room staff examining and 
treating the accused.  The officer returned to the 
accident scene where he learned that the 
speedometer of the car driven by the accused had 
locked at 140 km/h. He also noticed an empty beer 
bottle and beer carton in the interior of the vehicle.
When the officer later resumed his regular police 
duties he spoke with a probationary constable who 
had seen the accused at a wedding reception within 
an hour before the accident.  The probationary 
constable told the officer that he had seen the 
accused make several trips to the bar at the 
wedding reception and had last seen him, drink in 
hand, standing unsteadily at the bar.  The accused 
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol.  
Three days later the officer confirmed with a 
hospital employee that all health records about the 
accused’s treatment at the hospital after the 
accident were kept in its Health Records 
Department. The next day the officer sought and 
obtained a warrant to search for and seize the 
accused’s medical records regarding the treatment 
he received at the hospital “due to a motor vehicle 
accident”. The warrant was then executed. 
 
As a result of the information obtained on execution 
of the warrant and discussions with a laboratory 
technician in the Biochemistry Department of the 
hospital, the officer sought and obtained a second 
warrant to search for and seize blood samples taken 
from the accused, as well as documents relating to 
the care, custody, or control of those samples.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 
the accused sought to exclude the results of the 
toxicological analysis of the blood sample taken 
from him at the hospital.  The trial judge upheld the www.10-8.ca
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warrants and the accused was convicted. He then 
challenged the constitutionality of the warrants to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal claiming the 
information to obtain the first warrant failed to 
disclose a basis upon which the justice could 
reasonably conclude that the conditions precedent 
to the issuance of the search warrant under 
s.487(1)(b) of the Criminal Code had been met.  
According to the accused, the information to obtain 
the first warrant contained nothing upon which the 
justice could find that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that he had committed any 
offence listed in the warrant (s.253(a) of the 
Criminal Code) and that the medical records relating 
to his treatment would afford evidence with respect 
to the commission of an offence, in particular that 
blood samples had been taken from him. Justice 
Watt, however, in delivering the unanimous opinion 
of the court, dismissed the appeal. 
The test for determining the constitutional validity 
of the search warrant in this case “was whether 
there was reliable evidence in the sworn information 
before the justice that might reasonably be 
believed on the basis of which the justice could have 
granted the warrant,” said Justice Watt. “The test 
is not whether, in the reviewing judge’s opinion, the 
warrants should have issued, much less whether the 
reviewing judge would have issued the warrants 
himself if asked.”  Justice Watt continued:
In my view, there was reliable evidence before 
the issuing justice that might reasonably be 
believed upon which the justice could conclude 
that there were reasonable grounds to believe 
the [accused] had committed a driving offence 
described in the information, in particular, an 
offence contrary to s. 253(a) of the Criminal 
Code.  The essential finding, which required no 
determination that the [accused] was “at fault” 
for the accident, was amply supported by the 
cumulative effect of evidence of:
i. an odour of alcohol on the [accused’s] breath;
ii.  an empty beer bottle in the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle driven by the 
[accused] and an empty case of beer in the trunk;
iii. the manner in which the [accused] responded 
to emergency workers at the scene and the 
informant at the hospital;
iv.  the advanced state of intoxication of the 
[accused’s] passenger…confirming the likelihood 
of the [accused] as the driver;
v.  the excessive speed at which the [accused’s] 
vehicle was apparently travelling, nearly 50 km 
per hour in excess of the posted speed limit; and
vi. the observations of the probationary 
constable who had seen the [accused] at a 
wedding reception within an hour preceding the 
accident, and noticed that the [accused] was 
unsteady on his feet, apparently under the 
influence of alcohol, and had made several trips 
to the bar area at the wedding reception. [para. 
12] 
As well, Justice Watt ruled “the supportive 
information disclosed reliable evidence that might 
reasonably be believed upon which the issuing 
justice could conclude that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that the [accused’s] medical 
treatment records would provide evidence of [his] 
impairment”: 
 
The informant described the medical 
treatment administered to the [accused] at the 
hospital and the nature of the injuries the 
[accused] had apparently suffered. The officer 
later confirmed that all health records 
concerning the [accused’s] treatment at the 
hospital had been retained in its appropriate 
Health Records Department.  
According to the informant, the doctors 
examining the [accused] at the hospital were 
concerned about back injuries.   The [accused] 
had been thrown from the vehicle.  The issuing 
justice was entitled to draw the inference, at 
the least from the material contained in the 
information if not from everyday experience, 
that a routine hospital procedure in the 
treatment of accident victims whose serious 
injuries have not yet been determined is to take 
a blood sample for medical and hospital 
purposes. 
At trial, the parties argued their respective 
positions on a basis that included the evidence 
given by the informant at the preliminary 
inquiry.   There, the officer confirmed the 
presence of a laboratory technician in the room 
in which the appellant was being treated.  The 
technician was carrying “a standard small tray 
… which has got viles [sic] on them …”   The 
informant also gave evidence that, in his 
experience, hospitals usually screened blood 
samples routinely taken from accident victims 
for the presence of alcohol.  
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It was reasonable for the issuing justice to 
infer that the [accused’s] medical treatment 
records would indicate the existence of a blood 
sample, and that such a sample would be 
screened routinely for alcohol or drugs that 
might have an effect on any medication that 
might subsequently be administered.   Neither 
would it have been unreasonable for the issuing 
justice to infer that the treatment records 
may well include other evidence.  After all, the 
phrase “evidence with respect to the 
commission of an offence” in s. 487(1)(b) 
includes anything relevant or rationally 
connected to the incident under investigation.  
[references omitted, para. 15-17]
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the 
warrant to search for and seize medical records was 
not constitutionally flawed. Therefore, there was no 
reason to apply s.24(2) of the Charter to the 
evidence of the results of any toxicological analysis.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POLICE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED 
BY CONSCIENTIOUS EMPLOYEE 
HELP PROVE POSSESSION
R. v. McCallum, 2007 SKCA
Police executed a search warrant at a 
residence where eleven people were 
found, including the accused who was 
arrested along with several other 
occupants. At the police station they were all 
searched individually and separately from each 
other. The search of the accused yielded nothing of 
interest and his pants and personal belongings were 
placed in an individual pile, but in proximity to the 
belongings of other individuals who had been 
searched already. A book-in sheet bearing the 
accused’s name, address, date of birth, and list of 
belongings was prepared by another officer 
assisting in the process. According to normal police 
procedures, the book-in sheet was then placed on 
top of the belongings. Neither officer handling the 
belongings had any specific recollection of the 
accused, but testified that normal procedures were 
followed.
An experienced guard of 13 years service was on 
duty that night. He directed the officer to take the 
accused to cell number 10. The guard then picked up 
the pile of belongings with the accused’s book-in 
sheet. He wrote "Cell 10" on the sheet and placed 
the belongings and the book-in sheet into a basket 
also marked "Cell 10". He took the basket to his desk 
to check the effects once more before they were 
locked in storage. In so doing, he found a packet 
containing 10.1 grams of cocaine in a pants pocket 
that were in the basket holding the book-in sheet 
for the accused.
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of  possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. Among other 
findings, the trial judge ruled that the accused’s 
possession of the 10.1 grams of cocaine found at the 
police station was established by the following:
(1) The evidence of established police 
procedure involving searches of a group of 
individuals one by one, and assembling the 
belongings of that individual in a distinct pile in 
a manner that would make them difficult to 
mix-up;
(2) The credible evidence of a guard, an 
employee with some thirteen years' 
experience, who, in the trial judge's view, did 
his job properly. The guard testified the piles 
of belongings were separate, and not 
sufficiently close to create any mix-up since 
they were placed in distinct piles on the floor 
of a large room that was between 15 and 25 
feet in length. The guard determined which cell 
the [accused] would be placed in, located the 
belongings with the appellant's book-in sheet, 
marked the sheet with the [accused’s] cell 
number and placed the belongings in the basket 
also bearing the [accused’s] cell number. The 
guard did the final check of the basket before 
securing it away and in doing so found the 10.1 
grams of cocaine in the belongings with the 
[accused’s] book-in sheet. The trial judge was 
evidently more than satisfied that the guard 
performed his duties in a careful and thorough 
manner; and
(3)   The absence of complaint by anyone that 
they had not received their proper belongings 
back. [para. 9]
He was sentenced to one year incarceration, but 
appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that carelessness and lack of 
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thoroughness on the part of the police in searching 
him upon his arrest raised a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the Crown's evidence was accurate or 
believable. 
Justice Wilkinson, reporting the opinion for the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, ruled the trial 
judge’s findings of fact and inferences drawn from 
those findings were reasonably made and he was 
entitled to make them. Although the accused’s 
search at the station lacked thoroughness, the trial 
judge was satisfied that the systems and 
procedures for linking belongings to prisoners was 
itself manifestly reliable, and that there was no 
concern in this case that the belongings had been 
intermingled or mixed up. The trial judge placed 
considerable emphasis on the evidence of the guard, 
a long term and conscientious employee. The 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found no basis to 
intervene in the trial judge’s ruling. The accused’s 
conviction appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at ww.canlii.org
PROSPER WARNING NOT 
NECESSARY WHEN DETAINEE 
CLEARLY WAIVES RIGHT
R. v. Basko, 2007 SKCA 111
The accused was detained during a 
routine traffic stop and displayed 
signs of impairment. Upon being 
advised of his right to retain counsel 
at the scene, the accused responded that he knew 
of his right to a lawyer and would love to talk to one. 
He was taken to the police station and booked in. 
Shortly after arriving, he indicated he wished to 
speak to Legal Aid. 
The police officer dialled the 
number for Legal Aid and it was 
busy. He dialled a second time, but 
it was still busy. After waiting a 
short interval, the police officer 
dialled a third time. The accused, 
upon hearing the busy signal, said to 
the officer, “I know what they are 
going to tell me, so I’ll call one 
tomorrow”. In total, the officer had 
spent about five minutes on the telephone 
attempting unsuccessfully to contact a legal aid 
lawyer on the accused’s behalf. The police officer 
then asked, “Would you like to try a different 
lawyer?” and the accused responded, “No, let’s get 
it over”, referring to the giving of samples, which 
were then taken. He was subsequently charged with 
impaired and over 80mg%. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the judge 
found the accused’s right to counsel under s.10(b) of 
the Charter had been breached. In his view the 
police did not take the opportunity, as required, to 
give the accused additional information, referred to 
as the Prosper warning.  The Prosper warning is 
required when a detainee has previously asserted 
the right to counsel and indicates that they have 
changed their mind and no longer want that advice. 
The advice informs the detainee of their right to a 
reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer and of 
the obligation on the police during this time to 
refrain from having them participate in any process 
that would incriminate them. As a result, the 
breathalyzer certificate was excluded as evidence 
under s.24(2).
The Crown appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s Bench. The appeal judge ruled, in part, that 
the Crown had proven that when the accused 
changed his mind and decided not to obtain legal 
advice, he gave a clear and unequivocal waiver.  The 
evidence showed the accused chose not to wait for 
the telephone line to be available nor to telephone a 
private lawyer. There was no need for the officer to 
provide the Prosper warning. Therefore, there was 
no breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter and the 
certificate of analysis was admissible at trial. The 
Crown’s appeal was successful and the case was 
remitted back to Provincial Court 
for continuation. 
The accused then appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. 
Justice Wilkinson, writing the 
opinion for the court, first 
explained the Prosper warning:
The obligation to administer the 
[Prosper] warning arises if a 
detained person initially asserts his 
“The Prosper warning ensures 
that a detainee who wants to 
waive the right to counsel will 
know what is being given up. 
 The burden of establishing 
waiver, which must be 
unequivocal, voluntary, and free 
of compulsion, either direct or 
indirect, is upon the Crown.”
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or her right to counsel and is duly diligent in 
exercising it, (having been afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise it), but has 
a change of mind and no longer wants to consult 
counsel.   In such cases, according to the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. 
Prosper…, in a jurisdiction where a duty counsel 
service does exist but is unavailable at the 
precise time of detention, s. 10(b) does impose 
on the police an obligation to “hold off” 
attempts to elicit incriminatory evidence from 
the detainee until he or she has had a 
reasonable opportunity to reach counsel. From 
that flows an additional informational 
obligation (the “Prosper warning”) to “tell the 
detainee of (a) his or her right to a reasonable 
opportunity to contact a lawyer, and (b) the 
obligation on the part of the police during this 
time not to take any statements or require the 
detainee to participate in any potentially 
incriminating process until he or she has had 
that reasonable opportunity”. 
 
The Prosper warning ensures that a detainee 
who wants to waive the right to counsel will 
know what is being given up.   The burden of 
establishing waiver, which must be unequivocal, 
voluntary, and free of compulsion, either direct 
or indirect, is upon the Crown. [paras. 2-3]
Here, the Prosper proposition did not apply. The 
waiver made by the accused was in “decidedly 
unequivocal terms.” The accused simply changed his 
mind about consulting counsel and was afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to contact someone other 
than legal aid. He refused in no uncertain terms, 
saying “No, let’s get it over.” He clearly terminated 
his efforts and indicated a readiness to proceed to 
the next step. The trial judge failed to consider 
waiver in his analysis and therefore erred. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and the matter 
remitted back to Provincial Court to continue with 
the trial.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BROKEN LETTER OPENER A 
WEAPON
R. v. Keizer, 2007 NSCA 125
The accused and his girlfriend were 
asked to move out of a premises 
rented by another. He then became 
upset, pushed the victim onto a couch, 
pulled out a knife with a three inch blade, cut her 
neck (causing a laceration), and said, "I'll kill you 
right now." The accused then left and the police 
were called. The police found the accused close to 
the premises in possession of an implement with a 
broken blade (like a broken letter opener). At trial 
the accused was convicted of assault with a weapon 
and uttering a threat. He was sentenced to a two 
year federal sentence.
The accused appealed his conviction to the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that he 
should not have been found guilty of assault with a 
weapon because the implement he had in his 
possession when he was found was not a weapon, but 
only a broken, decorative letter opener.  
Justice Hamilton, for the unanimous Court, 
dismissed the appeal. "Weapon" is defined in s. 2 of 
the Criminal Code as meaning “any thing used, 
designed to be used or intended for use (a)  in 
causing death or injury to any person, or (b)  for the 
purpose of threatening or intimidating any person 
and, without restricting the generality of the 
foregoing, includes a firearm.” As for the implement 
used in this case, Justice Hamilton stated:
[A]ny thing used to cause injury to a person can 
be a weapon for the purpose of s. 267(a), 
including a letter opener, if that is a correct 
description of what was found in [the accused’s] 
possession when he was arrested. [para. 5]
The accused’s conviction was upheld.
Complete case available at
British Columbia’s Prosper Warning
You have the right to a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. I am obliged not to take 
a statement from you or ask you to participate in any process which could provide 
incriminating evidence until you are certain about whether you want to exercise this right. 
Do you understand? What do you wish to do?
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INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
LAWFUL ALMOST ONE HOUR 
AFTER REPORT
R. v. Ingle, 2007 BCCA 445
Shortly after midnight a woman called 
police to report an attempted theft 
from the backyard of her rural home 
that was seen by her husband about ten 
minutes earlier.  The report was that two white 
males, 16 to 17  years of age, one wearing a white 
T-shirt, had taken a large tool box from a pick-up 
truck, dropped it, and then fled south in the 
direction of the nearby elementary school.  Police 
officers responded to the report by setting up 
containment in the hope of intercepting the two 
suspects.  About 35 minutes after the report had 
been received an officer parked his patrol car at an 
intersection located more than 1.5 km. away from 
the residence.  The officer’s primary responsibility 
was to monitor the intersection, which was to the 
northwest of the residence from which the theft 
report had come, in an effort to locate the two 
suspects. Another officer was monitoring the next 
intersection to the east, a distance of about 1.8 
kilometres. 
The officer did not stop any of the vehicles which 
passed him on the main highway, a through road 
running in an east-west direction, but did, at about 
1:00  a.m., see a van northbound approaching the 
intersection. The van was the first vehicle he had 
observed traveling northbound after taking up his 
position and when the vehicle passed him, the 
officer saw two occupants who appeared to him to 
be males.   He made a U-turn, followed the van for 
about 1.5 kilometres, determined that the vehicle 
had not been reported stolen, and then pulled it 
over, just short of one hour after the attempted 
theft had been observed at the residence.  
As the officer approached the van to speak with the 
driver, he noticed a strong odour of marihuana and 
saw several large orange garbage bags in the cargo 
area.  The accused was asked for the vehicle 
registration and his driver’s licence. When backup 
arrived, the occupants of the van were asked to get 
out, told of the odour of marihuana coming from the 
vehicle, frisk-searched for weapons, handcuffed 
and placed in patrol vehicles.  During an initial search 
of the van, the officer opened some of the plastic 
bags and found they contained freshly cut 
marihuana. He then formally arrested the accused 
for possession of marihuana and possession for the 
purpose of trafficking and informed him of his s.10 
Charter rights. About 37.5 kgs. of marihuana was 
subsequently seized from the van.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
officer testified that he arrested the accused 
because he believed there was fresh marihuana in 
the vehicle. He said he was very familiar with the 
odour of marihuana, having investigated over 
150  marihuana grow operations during his eleven 
years as a police officer. The trial judge concluded 
that stopping the van was a valid investigative 
detention and did not breach s.9 of the Charter. She 
found the officer’s decision to stop the only vehicle 
he saw coming up the road in a semi-rural area in the 
general vicinity of where an offence had been 
reported, in which he saw two persons he believed to 
be male, was reasonably necessary on an objective 
view of the totality of the circumstances.  The trial 
judge continued:
Although [the officer] did not have much 
information about the alleged suspects, he 
stopped the van for the purpose of determining 
whether its occupants were the theft suspects 
the police were looking for.  He was not stopping 
all vehicles proceeding east/west, but decided 
to stop the van proceeding away from the area 
of the reported theft, based on his 
observations.   His decision to do so was 
strengthened by the fact that the van 
contained two individuals who he believed to be 
white males, who he regarded as engaging in 
what he called the “thousand-yard stare,” and 
therefore not wanting interaction with the 
police.   Although I appreciate that this stop 
was based on little actual information about 
those alleged theft suspects, I cannot ignore all 
the circumstances that I consider to be 
relevant, including the layout of the roads in 
the immediate area of the reported theft and 
the fact that Bradner Road was a thoroughfare 
that bounded the semi-rural area of the alleged 
theft to the west, the time of night, and the 
fact that the officer had not seen any other 
vehicles coming up the road since assuming his 
surveillance.  These circumstances 
strengthened his decision to stop the vehicle.  
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The rural nature of the area increased the 
likelihood that the theft suspects would resort 
to using a vehicle to leave the area.   It was a 
logical place to “set up containment of the 
area,” to use the words of the officer, and his 
views were shared by other police officers as 
there was another officer stationed nearby to 
the east.
I also note that had the officer not 
immediately noted the overpowering smell of 
fresh marihuana coming from the van, he would 
have queried the presence of the individuals in 
the area, and upon concluding they were not 
involved in the reported theft, sent them on 
their way.  His initial investigative detention of 
the accused’s van was extremely fleeting, to say 
the least, given that he was, upon approaching 
it, assailed by the overpowering odour of 
marihuana as he described.
Since the stop was lawful, the officer’s observations 
of the odour of fresh marihuana and the large 
orange garbage bags in the cargo area of the van 
immediately behind the driver, provided reasonable 
grounds to arrest. 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing, in part, that it was not reasonable 
(objectively or subjectively) for police to believe 
that a clear nexus existed between the two adult 
occupants of the van and the attempted theft that 
had been committed by two teenagers reported to 
have fled the scene on foot in the opposite direction 
40 minutes earlier and more than 3 kilometres away 
from the location of the stop. He further contended 
that that odour of marihuana and presence of 
garbage bags did not provide grounds to arrest. The 
Crown submitted that the stop was not arbitrary nor 
based on a mere whim or hunch considering the 
timing, location, and context of the reported crime. 
Rather, the circumstances as a whole gave rise to a 
reasonable suspicion to justify the roadside stop for 
investigative purposes
The Detention
“Whether an investigative detention infringes s. 9 
of the Charter generally turns on the specific 
facts…about the circumstances surrounding the 
detention,” said Justice Rowles, writing the 
judgment for the British Columbia Court of Appeal. 
The accused argued a number of “objective facts” 
that, in his view, could not support the officer’s 
subjective or objective basis to connect the accused 
and the reported offence. He was traveling by van 
northbound from the scene whereas the suspects 
were reported to be on foot fleeing southbound; his 
age did not match that of the suspects, he was 
detained 40 minutes after the attempted theft 3 
kilometres away from the scene; he was driving on a 
major road and was first noticed stopped at a red 
light at a major intersection where at least 3 to 5 
cars had already gone through the intersection 
reflecting normal traffic for that time; the city, 
while rural, has a population of 122,000 with more 
than 250,000 in the immediate area; and the only 
information matching both the accused and the 
suspects was that there were two white male 
suspects and the occupants of the van were “felt” to 
be white males. 
These facts put forward by the accused, however, 
did not match with all of the facts found by the trial 
judge nor with inferences she drew from them. For 
example, the area was rural and only two roads 
joined the highway in the area of the theft, one of 
which the officer was containing. The time of night 
was also significant as well as the fact the van was 
the only vehicle driven from the containment area. 
The trial judge did not err in concluding the stop was 
lawful.
The Arrest
The arrest was also lawful. The officer testified 
that he smelled fresh marihuana coming from the 
van and saw garbage bags in its cargo area. These 
observations, along with the officer’s extensive 
experience in investigating marihuana cases, 
provided the necessary reasonable grounds to 
arrest and search the vehicle as an incident to arrest.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“The arrest is our beachhead. The conviction our 
battle won.” - David Hansen & Thomas Culley
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BURNED MARIHUANA ODOUR 
ALONE INSUFFICIENT FOR 
ARREST
R. v. Janvier, 2007 SKCA 147
A police officer saw a truck with a 
broken front headlight and stopped it. 
When he was within a meter of the 
truck he could smell a strong, pungent 
odour of burned marihuana, leading him to conclude 
that someone had been smoking marihuana in the 
truck, possibly within the past 20 minutes. The 
accused, the vehicle’s sole occupant, was 
immediately arrested and his truck searched. The 
officer found one gram of marihuana in a clothing 
pocket, seven grams in a boot and a trace amount in 
the truck’s console. The officer also found what he 
believed to be a list of contacts and money in 
denominations consistent with trafficking. The 
accused was charged with possession for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused was acquitted. The trial judge ruled that 
the odour of burned marihuana alone did not provide 
the necessary grounds to arrest the accused or 
search the vehicle. In his view, the odour of burned 
marihuana in a confined space like a vehicle could 
provide a reasonable suspicion that marihuana was 
consumed at some time, but did not, without more 
(such as a cloud of smoke), provide 
reasonable grounds the person in the 
vehicle recently consumed it. The 
warrantless search was unreasonable, 
breached the accused’s s.8 Charter 
rights, and the evidence was excluded 
under s.24(2).
The Crown appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in his analysis. 
Arrest
Section 495(1) of the Criminal Code allows the police 
to arrest without warrant. In describing the power 
to arrest provided in this section Justice Jackson, 
stating the opinion of the Court, said this:
[T]he arrest power depends on the type of 
offence for which the person is being arrested. 
A police officer may arrest anyone he or she 
finds committing an offence. But if a police 
officer only believes, albeit on reasonable 
grounds, that someone has committed or is 
about to commit an offence, the offence must 
be an indictable one before the police officer 
can arrest. The distinction is a significant one 
in that it means, with respect to summary 
conviction offences, a police officer can only 
arrest a person he or she finds committing the 
offence. [para. 10]
In this case, the accused was initially arrested for 
possessing marihuana. This is a dual offence, if the 
quantity of marihuana possessed is 30 grams or 
more, but only a summary offence if less than 30 
grams. However, there was no evidence the officer 
believed the quantity was more than 30 grams and 
no basis to determine quantity based on smell alone. 
Thus, authority to arrest would need to arise from 
the stricter standard of arrest for summary 
offences. In other words, the officer would need to 
find the accused committing the offence, unlike the 
arrest power for indictable offences which permits 
arrests based on reasonable grounds. 
Here, “the officer did not see, hear, or smell [the 
accused] committing the offence of possessing 
marihunua, and therefore, did not find him 
committing that offence,” said Justice Jackson. Nor 
could it be inferred from the smell of burned 
marihuana alone that there was more marihuana 
present. Justice Jackson stated:
[Section] 495(1)(b) does not permit the 
officer to say "based on my experience, 
I believed I would find other marihuana 
present because I smelled recently 
burned marihuana." Observation (i.e., 
the smell) of recently smoked marihuana 
is not an observation of current 
possession of additional unsmoked 
marihuana. One might infer the presence of 
more marihuana, but one is not observing or 
smelling it and one is therefore not finding the 
person committing the offence of possession of 
additional, unsmoked, marihuana within the 
meaning of s. 495(1)(b). Section 495(1)(b) does 
not permit an arrest made on inference derived 
from the smell of burned marihuana alone. 
[emphasis in original, para. 30]
And even if such an inference could be drawn from 
the smell of recently burned marihuana by itself, it 
was not sufficient to give objectively reasonable 
 “Section 495(1)(b) does 
not permit an arrest made 
on inference derived from 
the smell of burned 
marihuana alone.” 
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grounds to believe that more, unsmoked 
marihuana was present. Unlike the odour 
of raw marihuana, where there is a direct 
relationship between the smell and the 
source of the smell such that the smell of 
raw marihuana is a sensory observation of 
the presence of raw marihuana (just as 
seeing it is) and provides grounds for arrest, the 
smell of burned marihuana is a sensory observation 
that marihuana has recently been smoked, but which 
does not provide the power to arrest. Moreover, 
there was no basis to assume that the accused was 
the person who consumed the marihuana in the 
vehicle. 
In holding that a reasonable person standing in the 
shoes of the officer would be unable to objectively 
conclude from the smell of burned marihuana alone 
that there was more marihuana present, Justice 
Jackson wrote:
In summary, as a matter of 
statutory construction, s. 
495(1)(b) does not permit 
an arrest based on the 
smell of burned marihuana 
alone. An officer smelling 
burned marihuana does not 
find a person committing 
the offence of possession 
of marihuana. If, contrary 
to my primary conclusion, 
s.495(1)(b) permits 
reliance upon an inference 
based on observation (i.e., 
smell), the smell of burned marihuana alone is 
not sufficient to support a reasonable 
inference that more, unsmoked marihuana will 
be present. Arresting someone is the 
penultimate interference with liberty, short of 
being in custody. In the circumstances of a 
summary conviction offence, which is 
recognized to be a less serious offence, 
Parliament has established a more constrained 
arrest power. [para. 48] 
 
Since the arrest was not lawful, the search incident 
to the arrest was also unlawful. 
CDSA Search Power
Under s.11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) “a police officer may 
exercise any of the powers in ss. 11(1) or (5) without 
warrant if the conditions 
for obtaining a warrant 
exist but exigent 
circumstances make it 
impracticable to obtain 
one.”  However, “the 
officer must have 
reasonable grounds to believe a controlled 
substance is on a person or in a place before 
searching the person or the place, without a 
warrant, if exigent circumstances exist making it 
impracticable to obtain a warrant.” Before 
considering whether exigent circumstances exist, 
there must be reasonable grounds to conduct the 
search. As discussed, Saskatchewan’s top court 
found there were no such objective grounds for 
belief that more unsmoked marihuana was present 
on the basis of a burned marihuana odour. Justice 
Jackson stated:
Plain smell evidence is recognized by 
this Court. The smell of burned 
marihuana is evidence. When the 
offence is possession of marihuana, 
the smell of burned marihuana will 
be one factor to determine whether 
there are reasonable grounds to 
search. Taken alone, the smell of 
recently burned marihuana does not 
reasonably support the inference 
that additional marihuana is present. 
[para. 54]
Thus, the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to search the 
accused or his vehicle under the CDSA. 
Evidence Exclusion 
Although the evidence was non-conscriptive and its 
admission would not affect trial fairness, a reduced 
expectation existed with respect to vehicles, and 
the evidence was important to the Crown’s case, the 
Charter breach was serious. The accused was not 
only searched without lawfully authority, but he was 
also arrested without lawful authority. Further, the 
nature and amount of drug seized indicated that it 
was not the most serious charge. The trial judge’s 
assessment of s.24(2) was not unreasonable and the 
Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“An officer smelling burned marihuana 
does not find a person committing the 
offence of possession of marihuana. 
If...s.495(1)(b) permits reliance upon 
an inference based on observation 
(i.e., smell), the smell of burned 
marihuana alone is not sufficient to 
support a reasonable inference that 
more, unsmoked marihuana will be 
present.” 
“Taken alone, the smell of recently 
burned marihuana does not 
reasonably support the inference 
that additional marihuana is 
present.”
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OFFENCE OF RESISTING 
OFFICER DOES NOT REQUIRE 
ARREST
R. v. M.L.M., 2007 ABCA 283 
 
The head of the Police Tactical unit 
received information that the accused 
was the lone occupant and driver of a 
stolen vehicle, may have been a member 
of an Asian gang involved in numerous drive by 
shootings using stolen vehicles, and may be in 
possession of a firearm. Police used their Tactical 
Unit, consisting of seven officers wearing uniforms 
that clearly indicated they were police officers, as 
a way to effect the arrest as quickly and as safely 
as possible. The Tactical Unit responds to high risk 
situations that may be too dangerous for regular 
police officers to handle. Each member of the 
Tactical Unit had been assigned responsibilities that 
would enhance the probability that both their 
safety and that of the public would be achieved
The arrest, which occurred mid-afternoon on a clear 
day, was ultimately made in the parking lot of a 
major store after the accused exited the store and 
returned to his vehicle. The vehicle was parked 
between two other vehicles and blocked in front by 
a post which protected the glass front of the store. 
The parking lot was icy in patches and busy with 
shoppers. When the accused entered his vehicle, the 
Tactical Unit van with emergency lights flashing was 
driven up immediately behind the stolen vehicle, 
about 18 inches away, blocking it. Both windows on 
the passenger side of the vehicle were smashed by 
police, they identified themselves, told the accused 
he was under arrest, and instructed him to place 
both hands on the dashboard, which he disregarded. 
The accused put the keys in the ignition, started the 
vehicle, and put the vehicle in reverse and 
accelerated. But because the parking lot was icy, the 
tires began to spin when the engine accelerated. The 
driver’s side windows were then smashed out. 
Concerned for public safety police tasered the 
accused and he was removed through the window and 
subsequently subdued. During the arrest process 
the accused had a piece of car window glass lodge in 
his right eye and, according to an eye physician and 
surgeon, is considered legally blind in that eye.
The accused pled guilty to possession of a stolen 
vehicle, but was also charged with other offences, 
including dangerous driving and resisting a peace 
officer in the execution of his duties. At trial in 
Alberta Provincial Court the judge found the 
accused was operating a motor vehicle even though 
it may or may not have moved. Once the accused 
started the vehicle and engaged the reverse gear, 
he was operating it and “driving”. His actions were 
also dangerous in light of all the circumstances. The 
vehicle was initially stopped in the parking lot of a 
major store, open for business, with other cars in 
the lot and with people in the parking lot going to and 
from the store. Members of the Tactical Unit had 
surrounded his vehicle. Engaging the reverse gear 
and accelerating after having been warned that he 
was under arrest was dangerous to the public. 
As for the resisting charge, the accused knew he 
was surrounded by police officers and ignored their 
commands, attempting to drive away. He knew he 
was being placed under arrest and was afforded 
more than one opportunity to comply. The taser was 
not immediately deployed and the fact he would not 
be allowed to exit the vehicle under his own power 
did not matter. Further, the officer was in the 
execution of his duty at the time he attempted to 
effect the arrest. He was a member of the Tactical 
Unit dressed in standard issue police tactical 
uniform with clearly identifiable markings. The 
accused was convicted of dangerous driving and 
resisting a peace officer. 
The accused appealed his convictions to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in 
convicting him of dangerous driving because he was 
not “driving” nor “operating” the vehicle and in 
finding him guilty of resisting a peace officer 
because there was no arrest yet when he didn’t obey 
the officers. 
Dangerous Driving
Section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code creates an 
offence for a person who operates a motor vehicle 
in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having 
regard to all the circumstances, including the 
nature, condition and use of the place at which the 
motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of 
traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be 
expected to be at that place.
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Although a driver cannot, 
under the Criminal Code, 
“operate” a vehicle that is 
actually immobile or 
immobilized, for example 
when lodged on a traffic 
median such that it could 
not be moved except by 
outside assistance, a 
vehicle that may not move 
at one instant can still be 
operated, such as one that 
may be temporarily stuck and is driven back and 
forth only a short distance. In this case, there was 
evidence that the accused attempted to put the car 
in motion by starting and reversing it. The engine 
was accelerating and the vehicle actually moved 
backwards and struck the police van. The vehicle was 
only partially on ice and could have moved. The 
accused was therefore operating the vehicle.
In upholding the trial judge’s view concluding that 
the accused operated the car in a manner dangerous 
to the public, the Court stated: 
The test for dangerous driving is well 
established. The question to be asked is 
whether a driver’s operation of a motor vehicle 
amounts to a marked departure from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person 
would observe in the accused’s situation. The 
mental element of the offence is a modified 
objective one, meaning that it should be 
assessed objectively in the context of all the 
events surrounding the incident. 
The trial judge reviewed the actions of the 
[accused] in light of all of the circumstances 
including the location, the proximity of 
members of the public, and the surrounding 
police officers and other vehicles. Reversing 
one’s vehicle rapidly in close proximity to a 
number of individuals and in a shopping centre 
parking lot during shopping hours where it 
should be reasonably expected that there will 
be pedestrians and other traffic, demonstrates 
a marked departure from the standard of care 
of a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances. [reference omitted, paras. 16-
17]
Resisting Peace Officer 
Section 129(a) of the Criminal Code creates an 
offence for a person who resists a peace 
officer. This section does not require an 
arrest, but only requires resisting a police 
officer in the execution of his duties. In this 
case, the duty the officer was executing was 
an attempt to put the accused under arrest, 
which he was not cooperating with, knowing 
that the officer was a police officer and that 
the car was stolen. 
The accused was also resisting. The trial judge 
found that the accused was given a reasonable time 
to comply with the officer’s orders to put his hands 
on the dashboard but instead started up the car, put 
it in reverse gear, and stomped on the gas pedal in 
an attempt to move it. This non-cooperation was 
resistance and a direct confrontation was not 
required. The Court of Appeal stated:
Starting a vehicle, placing it in gear, and 
attempting to drive away from [the officer] who 
was executing his duties in attempting to carry 
out an arrest clearly amounts to more than 
passive resistance. It is an active use of force 
to resist a peace officer. There is no basis upon 
which to upset the finding that these actions 
amounted to resistance as required under s. 
129(a). [para. 9]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
MORE THAN MERE PRESENCE AT 
CRIME SCENE REQUIRED FOR 
CONVICTION
R. v. Jackson, 2007 SCC 52
 
The accused was one of five people 
arrested at the site of a secluded 
marijuana plantation in a remote area 
of forest.  When police arrived, the 
accused was sleeping in a camouflaged tent on the 
site, containing fertilizer and growing equipment. He 
exited the tent wearing rubber boots, not the 
running shoes he claimed to have been wearing on his 
arrival.  The boots were his size — but belonged to 
“Starting a vehicle, placing it in 
gear, and attempting to drive 
away from [the officer] who was 
executing his duties in 
attempting to carry out an arrest 
clearly amounts to more than 
passive resistance. It is an 
active use of force to resist a 
peace officer.”
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someone else he said.  He had been at the site for 
at least two days.
The entire site was dedicated to the production of 
marijuana on a commercial scale.  There was no 
evidence it was any legitimate business enterprise, 
wilderness camp or other recreational activity.  Its 
dimensions and equipment indicated the operation 
involved more than one, or even two, participants. Of 
the four others present, two were previous 
acquaintances and at least one admitted being 
actively engaged in the production of marijuana on 
the plantation.  
 
At trial the accused was convicted of illegally 
producing marihuana. The trial judge ruled that the 
equipment found indicated that five people were 
involved.  The accused’s implausible explanation for 
his presence at the marijuana  plantation was 
rejected. His appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal 
was dismissed by a majority, so he appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada arguing his mere presence 
at the scene of a crime did not prove his culpable 
participation in its commission. 
“[A]n accused’s mere presence at the scene of a 
crime in circumstances consistent with innocence 
will not support a conviction,” said Justice Fish for 
the five member majority. However, Justice Fish 
noted there was more to this case than the 
accused’s mere presence on the marijuana 
plantation. Rather the evidence against him included 
“the cumulative effect of his apprehension at the 
scene, the rejection of his explanation for being 
there, the particular nature of the offence, the 
context in which it was committed, and other 
circumstantial evidence of his guilt.” It was 
therefore open to the trial judge to conclude that 
the accused’s presence at the scene of the crime 
was consistent only with his culpable involvement in 
the production of marijuana. 
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction affirmed.  
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Destiny is no matter of chance. It is a matter of 
choice. It is not a thing to be waited for, it is a thing 
to be achieved.” - William Jennings Bryan
“IF YOUR TRAINING DOES NOT 
ASSIST YOU WHEN YOU MOST 
NEED IT, WHY TRAIN?”
Insp. Kelly Keith, Atlantic Police Academy
As law enforcement officers we are often engaged 
in close quarter combat whether that be hand-to-
hand or firearms. Does your fitness program 
enhance your ability to win both? If you have a goal 
of optimizing your ability to win a physical 
confrontation with your fitness training you must 
select exercises with mechanical relevance to a 
physical confrontation.
According to the FBI studies in the United States 
from 1996 to 2005 the average age of suspects that 
killed Law Enforcement Officers in the United 
States was 29. Ninety five percent of these people 
were male, and the main weapon officers were killed 
with was a firearm. Fifty percent of the officers 
who were killed with a firearm were killed within five 
feet of the suspect, which is fighting distance 
whether you are fighting with a gun or your fists.
FBI studies also state that from 1996 to 2005 
there were 566,626 Law Enforcement Officers 
assaulted. An important fact is that 80% of the 
officers were assaulted with the suspects personal 
weapons such as hands, feet, etc.  
The methods of assaults range from kicking, 
punching, pushing, pulling, tackling the officer. The 
majority of the fights end up on the ground where 
the fight continues with grappling and further 
strikes. As well, most assaults are spontaneous, 
occur in dim lit situations, and are to facilitate the 
suspects escape. The fact that the assaults are 
spontaneous is why officers use their personal 
weapon such as their hands and feet more than 
anything else. They must be able to use their 
personal weapons either to get the suspect into 
handcuffs or give them time to get to the weapons 
on their belt.  
As law enforcement officers we are not training to 
fight in a 12 round fight - there is only one round, 
there is no tapping out, no referees, no doctors to 
stop the fight or treat you, no gender designations, 
no weight classes, no padded gloves or padded 
floors, generally consent is not mutual, there may be 
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more than one attacker and in some cases we are 
fighting for our lives.  Confrontations can occur in 
small areas with furniture or vehicles around.  All 
techniques and training must be tailored to work on 
suspects that are Hulk Hogan’s size to half the 
officer’s size.  In law enforcement confrontations 
we may be fighting with an intermediate weapon such 
as a baton or taser or we may be fighting to give 
ourselves the space to get to our weapons on our 
belt.  Most real fights regardless of whether they 
are law enforcement related or not are over in under 
one minute.  
Most fitness programs are built around looking good 
on the beach such as a bodybuilder physique, losing 
fat, or long distance training.  Long runs and bicep 
curls will not make the difference in a real assault.  
Unfortunately most law enforcement officers train 
with weights or do aerobic activities that will 
prepare them for a particular sport, not for a real 
fight. We must make our training more effective in 
a confrontation by being more specific with it!  Most 
training I see and know law enforcement officers 
are doing will not give them a harder punch, kick, 
better footwork, nor a harder baton swing. The 
physical actions involved in a kick, punch, strike with 
a baton, or escape from a ground assault are not 
emulated with most weight training routines. For 
example, abdominal crunches will make you stronger 
in the action of bringing your shoulders closer to 
your hips but how is this assisting you in a 
confrontation?  
Kicks, punches baton swings, and take downs all 
stress different muscles, however, they generally 
involve rotational power, speed strength, core and 
trunk muscles, with force transitioned from one 
body part to another. For example, a dominant hand 
punch involves you transitioning your weight and 
momentum from your back foot to your front foot 
and rotating your torso in the direction of the target 
in order to generate your power.  You need to strike 
through the target and not stop the momentum so 
the weight bar does not fly out of our hands, like 
traditional weight training does. Most 
confrontations involve full body movements such as 
pushing, pulling, and grappling whereas standard 
weight training routines do not work the muscles in 
this manner. To be truly prepared for an attack we 
cannot only concentrate on one form of strength 
training or fitness. We need to use full body 
movements, minimize isolation exercises, develop 
power in the body movements that will assist us when 
we most need it, and concentrate on more than just 
one (strength and/or cardiovascular) component of 
fitness.  There are many fitness components such as:
• Muscular Power / Speed Strength
• Muscular Strength
• Muscular Endurance
• Balance
• Cardiovascular / Aerobic Endurance
• Anaerobic Endurance
• Agility
• Quickness / Reaction time
• Speed
• Coordination
If you want to look like a bodybuilder then train and 
eat like a body builder. However if you want your 
time spent in the gym to help you win confrontations 
then your training must reflect this!
About the Author - Insp. Kelly Keith is a 20 year 
veteran of law enforcement. He presently teaches 
Physical Training, Use of Force and Tactical 
Firearms to Corrections, Law and Security, 
Conservation Officers and Police Cadets at the 
Atlantic Police Academy. Kelly is a second degree 
black belt in Jiu-Jitsu and a Certified Personal 
Trainer, Strength and Conditioning Instructor, and 
a Certified Sports Nutrition Specialist. He can be 
reached by email at KKeith@pei.sympatico.ca 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Search Incident to Arrest
“A warrantless search incidental to arrest 
is authorized by the common law power 
of search incidental to arrest. Its three 
main purposes include police and public 
safety, protection of evidence from 
destruction, and discovery of evidence for trial. The scope 
of the search is limited by its discretionary nature, the 
requirement for a valid objective (being at least one of the 
purposes of the search) and the reasonableness of the 
manner in which the search is conducted. If these 
conditions are met, then a search incidental to arrest will be 
‘authorized by law’ for the purposes of s. 8 of the Charter.” 
- British Columbia Supreme Court Justice Smith, R.   v.  
Tetreault, 2007 BCSC 1624, para. 25, references omitted. 
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The rate of assaults against British Columbia police 
in 2006 was 14.7 per 100 police officers. This is 
higher than the U.S. average rate of assaults at 
11.8 per 100 sworn officers as reported by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, 2006). 
Obstruction
The number of offences of obstructing police have 
also increased in 2006, up 
20% over 2005. In 
2000 there were a 
reported 1,226 obstruct police 
offences. That total had risen 
to 1,955 offences in 2006; an 
increase of more than 59%. 
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ASSAULTS AGAINST 
BC POLICE CONTINUE 
TO RISE
Although the Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics reported in July that Canada’s overall 
crime rate dropped by 3% in 2006, British 
Columbia’s Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General again reports that assaults against the 
police are on the rise. The number of 
offences for assaulting 
police have risen from a 
10 year low of 750 in 
1997 to a 10 year high of 1,127 in 
2006. That is an increase of 
more than 50%. Of the 1,127 
reported offences in 2006, 1,048 were cleared, 
representing a clearance rate of almost 93%. There 
were 799 persons 
charged with 
assaults against 
police, including 
709 adults and 90 
youths. Perhaps 
most disturbing, is 
that the number of 
youths charged 
with assaulting a 
police officer in 
2006 rose more 
than 30% over 
2005.
 50%
Obstruct
Police
 59%
Assault 
Police
Persons Charged Assault Police
Source: Police and Crime, Summary Statistics, 1997-2006, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General
2006
Assault Police Offences & Rates
Year Number of Offences Number of Officers Rate per 
100 Officers
2006 1,127 7,678 14.7
2005 1,021 7,469 13.7
2004 922 7,193 12.8
2003 934 7,106 13.1
2002 878 6,958 12.6
2001 834 6,895 12.1
2000 807 6,708 12.0
Source: Police and Crime, Summary 
Statistics, 1997-2006, Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General
Source: Statistics Canada, Police 
Resources in Canada, Years 2000-
2005, Catalogue No:85-225-XIE
1997 200620052004200320022001200019991998
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Obstruct Police Offences
Year Number of Offences
2000 1,226
2001 1,330
2002 1,421
2003 1,384
2004 1,524
2005 1,552
2006 1,955
Source: Police and Crime, Summary Statistics, 1997-2006, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General
Weapons 
Possession
 130%
The clearance rate for obstruction was 92%, with 
1,800 reported offences cleared in 2006.
Weapons Possession
The rate of weapons 
possession offences 
has also risen considerably. 
In 1999 there were 1,695 
reported weapons possession 
offences. By 2006 that total 
had more than doubled to 3,902. That’s a whopping 
130% increase.  
Weapons Possession Offences: 1999-2006
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Bail Violation Offences: 1996-2006
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Bail 
Violations
 135%
Bail Violations
The number of reported 
bail violations has also increased 
at a staggering rate. Since 1996, 
bail violations have more than 
doubled, rising from 4,327 to 
more than 10,000. In just the last year, the 
number of reported bail offences rose 27%, from 
7,978 in 2005 to 10,191 in 2006. 
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  RCMP FAST FACTS
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is 
Canada’s largest police organization. As 
of January 1, 2008 the force was 
25,417 strong, including 17,150 police 
officers, 60 special constables, 
3,078 civilian members and 5,129 
public servants. As well, more than 
75,000 volunteers assist the RCMP 
which is divided into four regions with 15 divisions. 
(source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca)
CANADA’s LARGEST MUNICIPAL RCMP 
DETACHMENTS
Detachment Police Officers
Surrey BC 477
Richmond BC 306
Burnaby BC 228
Kelowna BC 143
Prince George BC 128
Langley Township BC 126
Coquitlam BC 123
Nanaimo BC 121
Kamloops BC 111
Red Deer AB 107
Source: Statistics Canada, 2007, Police Resources in 
Canada, Catalogue No:85-225-XIE
BC
5,743 AB
2,396
QC
971ON
1,341
SK
1,142
MN
989
NF
495
YK
119
NU
123NWT
175
NS
960
PEI
137
NB
890
RCMP ‘HQ’ & Training Academy 1,652
Source: Statistics Canada, 2007, 
Police Resources in Canada, 
Catalogue No:85-225-XIE
Region Division Area
North West D Manitoba
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
V Nunavut Territory
K Alberta
Depot Regina, Saskatchewan
Pacific E British Columbia
M Yukon Territory Region Division Area
Central A National Capital Region
O Ontario
C Quebec
Atlantic B Newfoundland
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
L Prince Edward Island
Numbers under each 
provincial abbreviation 
indicate number of 
RCMP officers
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FORMER SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE DIES  
The Honourable Louis-
Philippe de Grandpré, 
formerly a justice of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, 
passed away in St. Lambert, 
Quebec, on January 24, 2008. 
Born in Montreal, Justice de 
Grandpré studied law at 
McGill University. He was 
called to the bar of Quebec in 
1938, and practised law in 
Montreal, eventually co-founding the law firm of 
Tansey, de Grandpré et de Grandpré. 
Justice de Grandpré lectured at McGill University 
from 1960 to 1963. He was the president of the bars 
of Montreal and Quebec in 1968 and 1969. In 1971 
he was made a Companion of the Order of Canada. 
From 1972 to 1973, he was the president of the 
Canadian Bar Association.
Justice de Grandpré was appointed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada in 1974. He retired from the Court 
in 1977. Justice de Grandpré returned to the 
practice of law, and continued to practice for many 
years. He was made a Grand Officer of the National 
Order of Quebec in 1998.
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, on behalf of the 
members of the Supreme Court of Canada, mourned 
Justice de Grandpré’s passing, “Louis-Philippe de 
Grandpré was an eminent jurist. His distinguished 
career demonstrates his devotion and dedication to 
the legal profession. As a lawyer, and a judge, he 
recognized that the law must not be isolated, but 
must respond to the needs of the society it serves. 
His presence and contributions to the law and 
justice will be sorely missed. Members and 
employees of the Court extend their deepest 
condolences to his family.” 
Insignia      Rank # of Positions
 
Commissioner 1
 
Deputy Commissioner 7
 
Assistant Commissioner 26
 
Chief Superintendent 59
 
Superintendent 157
 
Inspector 398
 
Corps Sergeant Major 0
 
Sergeant Major 7
 
Staff Sergeant Major 9
 
Staff Sergeant 762
 
Sergeant 1,707
 
Corporal 3,063
Constable 10,954
Total 17,150
source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about/organi_e.htm, [accessed 
January 27, 2008]
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IN BRIEF: SECTION 8 & THE 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Section 8 of the Charter gives 
everyone the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and 
seizure. From a plain reading of 
this Charter guarantee, s.8 is only 
engaged if there is an 
unreasonable ‘search’ and/or 
‘seizure’. The provisions of s.8 must also be read 
disjunctively, protecting against searches, seizures 
in connection with searches, or seizures by 
themselves [1]. Thus one could say that this 
constitutional provision is not triggered if there is 
no ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ at all. And if the search or 
seizure is reasonable, s.8 accepts its validity. Either 
way, the concept of reasonableness is 
the touchstone of the 
constitutionality of a police search or 
seizure. 
The s.8 guarantee can be stated two 
ways. First, it can be expressed as a 
"freedom from 'unreasonable' search 
and seizure", or secondly, as an 
"entitlement to a 'reasonable' 
expectation of privacy"[2]. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has stated that the underlying purpose of s.8 
is "to secure the citizen's right to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against government 
encroachments” [3]. (see also Evans [4], “the 
fundamental objective of s.8 is to preserve the 
privacy interests of individuals”; Plant [5], “the 
purpose of s.8 is to protect against intrusion of the 
state on an individual’s privacy”). It is a personal 
right and protects people, not places [6]. For 
example, it could be argued that an unoccupied 
public washroom stall would not be protected by s. 8. 
However, if a person were to occupy that same stall, 
it could be said that a person may have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and be afforded some 
protection by s.8 [7]. Remember though, like any 
Charter right, s.8 is intended to constrain the 
actions of the police and is not in itself an 
authorization for the police to act. In other words, 
it does not confer any powers, even “reasonable” 
search or seizure, on the police [8]. It does, 
however, accept searches or seizures that are 
reasonable as being non offensive to the section. 
Why are s.8 violations so vigorously argued in court? 
Here is how it works. Under the Charter’s s.24(2) 
exclusionary provision evidence will only be excluded 
from being used against an accused if it was 
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied their 
Charter rights (and the administration of justice 
would be brought into disrepute). The provision is 
not designed to protect against conviction of the 
innocent, but rather to protect the integrity of the 
justice system. Interestingly, in Collins, Supreme 
Court of Canada Justice Lamer agreed “it is not open 
to the courts in Canada to exclude evidence to 
discipline the police, but only to avoid having the 
administration of justice brought into disrepute.” It 
does, however, have the practical effect of curbing 
improper police conduct. 
Standing
Under s.24(2) a court may 
exercise its discretion and 
exclude evidence obtained by 
unconstitutional searches or 
seizures even if the admission 
of such evidence would clearly 
establish guilt. However, a 
claim for relief under s.24(2) 
can only be made by a person whose Charter rights 
have been infringed. In other words, the accused 
needs status, or standing, to complain about the 
search or seizure and challenge the unlawful conduct 
that lead to the discovery of the evidence. If they 
don’t have it, the conduct of the police during the 
search is generally irrelevant [9]. This is so because, 
as a general rule, the privacy right allegedly 
infringed must be that of the person who makes the 
challenge [10] (in criminal cases the defendant). 
Exclusion of evidence under s.24(2) can only be 
argued by those whose rights have been violated by 
the search or seizure itself, not by those who are 
only aggrieved by the introduction of the damaging 
evidence. In sum, s.24(2) provides constitutional 
remedies only to persons whose own Charter rights 
have been infringed and if no personal right is 
breached, the person cannot contest the 
admissibility of the evidence under s.24(2) and the 
police conduct during the search or seizure is not 
pertinent. For example, in Hok [11], the police went 
onto a neighbour’s property to investigate a grow 
operation against the accused. He tried to argue 
“[Section 24(2)] is not designed to 
protect against conviction of the 
innocent, but rather to protect the 
integrity of the justice system. It 
also has the effect of curbing 
improper police conduct.”
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that the police trespassed at night on his 
neighbour’s property, an offence under s.177 of the 
Criminal Code, and therefore the evidence obtained 
during that illegal conduct should be excluded. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice Southin 
concluded the court could not exclude illegally 
obtained evidence unless it was obtained in violation 
of the accused’s rights, not his neighbour’s. On the 
other hand, if standing, violation, and exclusion are 
successfully argued, the Crown cannot use the 
evidence to secure a conviction.
More on 24(2)
In s.24(2) jurisprudence the Crown does not have 
the onus of proving evidence should be admitted. 
Relevant evidence, even evidence improperly 
obtained, is prima facie admissible [12]. (see also 
Khelawon [13], “The basic rule of evidence is that all 
relevant evidence is admissible.”) The burden, 
rather, lies on the applicant or party seeking 
exclusion of the evidence to establish on a balance 
of probabilities that the admission of the evidence 
would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute [14]. In Garofoli [15], Supreme Court of 
Canada Justice Sopinka described s.24(2) like this:
Section 24(2) is an exclusionary rule and not an 
inclusionary rule. It operates to exclude evidence 
that would otherwise be admissible where to 
admit the evidence would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. Evidence that is 
inadmissible by reason of some other exclusionary 
rule cannot be admitted by invoking s.24(2). 
The 24(2) assessment in whether the admission of 
the evidence will bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute involves three factors:
1) trial fairness;
2) seriousness of the Charter violation (or 
seriousness of the police conduct [16]). Factors 
relevant to the seriousness of the breach 
include:
 whether it was committed in good faith, or 
was inadvertent or of a merely technical 
nature, or whether it was deliberate, wilful 
or flagrant [17]
 whether the violation was motivated by a 
situation of urgency or necessity [18]
 whether the police officer could have 
obtained the evidence by other means, thus 
rendering their disregard for the Charter 
gratuitous and blatant [19];  or
 the existence of reasonable and probable 
grounds [20] 
3) effect of the exclusion of evidence on the 
administration of justice.
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‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (b) False—see R. V. Doyle (at p. 12 of this 
publication). 
2. (a) Auto accidents—see see On-Duty Deaths 
Down (at p. 4 of this publication). 
3. (a) False—see R. v. Ingle (at p. 30 of this 
publication). 
4. (b) False—at least in Saskatchewan, see R. v. 
Janvier (at p. 32 of this publication). 
5. (a) True—see R. v. M.L.M.  (at p. 34 of this 
publication). 
6. (a) True—see R. v. Jackson (at p.  35 of the 
publication)  
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PROLIFIC AND 
DANGEROUS 
OFFENDERS: 
REDUCING THEIR 
IMPACT ON PUBLIC 
SAFETY CONFERENCE
March 31-April 3, 2008
Abbotsford, B.C.
The 2008 Fraser Valley Criminal Justice 
Conference will bring together BC expertise 
for a comprehensive look into prolific and 
dangerous offenders. This  conference will 
provide insight into how various agencies 
attempt to coordinate their efforts to 
maximize public safety. Representatives 
from the Police, Correctional Service 
Canada, Crown Counsel, local experts from 
UBC and UCFV,  and support services will 
speak to various topics relating to high risk 
offenders. This will be an opportunity to 
learn about prolific and dangerous 
offenders, the application of research and 
knowledge, best practice models of 
supervision, enforcement, treatment and 
support.
The goal of the conference is to foster 
relationships between the various 
professional communities and provide a 
better understanding of prolific and 
dangerous offenders. In addition, the 
conference intends to provide varying 
points of view so that those in attendance 
may implement the ideas and measures 
suggested, or utilize the knowledge from 
the conference and develop their own 
ventures of how in fact to manage 
dangerous and prolific offenders in the 
community setting.
THREATENING CONDUCT MUST 
BE MORE THAN INAPPROPRIATE 
& UNWANTED
R. v. Burns, 2008 ONCA 6
The accused, a police officer in full 
police uniform, was on foot downtown in 
broad daylight when he wolf-whistled at 
the complainant, who was walking down 
the street with her five-year old daughter after 
leaving a bank, said “nice butt” or “nice ass” and then, 
after the complainant sped up to get away from him, 
called out “are those pants painted on”.  The 
complainant and accused knew one another but had 
virtually no contact in the three years prior to the 
incident. 
 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused was convicted of criminal 
harassment. However, he appealed his conviction to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal arguing the elements of 
the offence had not been proven.   In allowing the 
appeal, the Court stated:
To establish harassment under s. 264(2)(d) of 
the Criminal Code, the Crown had to establish 
that the [accused] engaged in “threatening 
conduct”. … [I]n order to meet the objectives 
of s. 264, the threatening conduct must amount 
to a “tool of intimidation which is designed to 
instill a sense of fear in the recipient”.  The 
impugned conduct is to be viewed objectively, 
with due consideration for the circumstances in 
which they took place, and with regard to the 
effects those acts had on the recipient.  
………
While the [accused’s] conduct was clearly 
inappropriate and unwanted, we do not see the 
incident as amounting to threatening conduct 
within the meaning of those words in s. 
264(2)(d).  Although the complainant justifiably 
felt upset and scared by the [accused’s] 
conduct, viewed objectively, we do not see it as 
rising to the level of a “tool of intimidation 
designed to instill a sense of fear”. [references 
omitted, paras. 2-4]
The accused’s conviction for criminal harassment was 
set aside and an acquittal entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
www.padoconference.com
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